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INTRODUCTION 
From the United States Senate to Columbus Circle~he 
national question of the year has been tlWhat are we going to 
do about the Negro-White problem?ft The solutions suggested 
have been as varied as the types of people making them. But 
few of these solutions have ever gone to the roots of the prob-
lem; few have looked to Uthe science of ultimates" for help. 
According to i ts definition philosophy is t'the science 
of all things as known through their ultimate causes." It is 
the purpose of philosophy, therefore, to give final and ultim-
ate answers. Today a presentation of philosophical principles 
as they affect the so-called race question is especially neces~ 
sary because most American ,thinkers do not truly understand 
the relation of social problems -- and especially the problem 
of race relations -- to the science that searches the ultimate 
causes o! all things. Everyone admits that the race question 
is a social problem; few are willing to admit that it is first 
of all a philosophical problem. The axiom, agere sequitur 
~, indicates that the value of any action will be only as 
true and solid as the principles from which it flows. One's 
answer to the race question depends entirely upon one's phi-
losophy or lack of it. The false answers to the question 
come from false philosophical principles or from a denial of 
true principles. If Americans neglect or abuse the true 
basis of their problem, they will never arrive at a true 
1 
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understanding that will lead them to the reasonable and only 
satisfactory solution. 
Our chief purpose is to present the principles of Schol-
astic philosophy as a basis for a true understanding of the 
problem of Negro-White relationships in the United States. 
This basis begins with the fact of God's existence and pro-
ceeds to a study of the nature and consequent dignity of the 
human person, who thus becomes the subject of certain inalien-
able rights. 
In this thesis we are not dealing with theological proofs 
as found in Christian Revelation. We do not deny the import-
ance of theology in a study of this kind. Philosophy, after 
all, is but the hand-maid of theology; it gives only the be-
ginning for a perfect understanding of our problem. Theologi-
cal truths are necessary for a perfect understanding because 
Christian Revelation perfects manls knowledge about the nature 
and operations of God and about manls own value as a human 
person. The truths concerning the Fatherhood of God; the New 
Law of Love given to men by Jesus Christ, the second Person of 
the Blessed Trinity; and the union in Christ of the members of 
His Mystical Body are sublime doctrines definitely related to 
the question of race relations and they should be studied and 
appreciated more than they are. However, it is necessary for 
us to limit ourselves; here we shall present only the be-
ginning of an answer that can be perfected by the truths of 
theology. 
10""" 3 
Besides the positive presentation of the principles of 
Scholastic philosophy we have as a kind of corrobora~ve corol-
lary a negative approach by which we reply to the various 
"other answers" to the race question. We will begin with an 
outline of these answers; our replies to them will follow our 
positive presentation. 
CHAPTER I 
THE OTHER ANSWERS 
When asked to give an opinion or to answer a question 
men frequently forget "the other fellow's viewpoint." It 
is natural for men to think that theirs is the only solu-
tion and that other answers are not worthy of consideration. 
Lest we seem to fall into this common human failing, we will 
begin our thesis with the "other answers"; we will 'show how 
other students have treated the so-called race question. 
The first group of philosophers who have definite prin-
ciples affecting race relations are those commonly known as 
totalitarian. The main tenet of these ph1losophers is that 
the chosen social group is absolutely autonomous, a kind of 
super-individual entity that is superior to other individuals 
and distinct from them. As Ross Hoffman states: 
All that goes on in the life 
of society, all economic and 
cultural activity, all intellec-
tual expression, all associa-
tional enterprise, is brought 
under the rule of the State ••• 
made subject to whatever 
4 
regulation the State may choose 
to impose. III 
From this primum principium they immediately deduce that all 
rights depend on the group because a man has value only as a 
member of. the group. The main thesis of the totalitarian 
philosophers is always the same; the applications of their 
thesis differ according to the chosen social groups in which 
it is incorporated. 
Communism or Classism is a form of totalitarianism that 
5 
has set up the proletarian class as the absolutely independent 
unit in society. Communism is not merely a political philoso-
phy but a creed and philosophy of life. Communism began with 
an economic purpose; its aim was to build a new economic 
order which would lead to a classless society; in order to 
accomplish this, revolution was necessary; private ownership 
had to be abolished, property conscripted, the economic as-
pects of human life subordinated to the rulers of the society, 
which is the organ of class domination. Although Karl Marx, 
lROSS Hoffman, The Will tq Freedom, Sheed & Ward, London 
1935, 60. 
The word "totalitarian" should apply to all forms of phil-
osophy or social living in which all the rights of individuals 
are considered as coming from one absolute source. Here it is 
a term which must be applied analogously to the completely 
group-absolute philosophy. A comparison of the cardinal prin-
ciples of various totalitarian philosophies will manifest many 
points of difference; it is the spirit of totality which mo-
tivates them that is the same for all. Philosophically total-
itarianism has its roots in the doctrines of Hobbes, Hegel, 
Fichte, and Marx. It is the antonym of liberalism, although 
it has historically -- and logically -- emerged from the basic 
principles of liberalism. 
the father of Communism, made blind evolutionary matter an 
., 
absolute, this theory has produced and given away to a more 
v 
mystical absolute -- the proletarian class. The collectivity 
of the proletarians has become the integrating principle of 
all social life; it has become the measure of all values: 
moral, religious, ethical, economical; the goal and destiny 
of each individual. The relationships based on such acci-
dental qualities as racial differences and physical charac-
teristics have been completely immersed in the classless 
society dominated by a dictatorial proletariat. For the 
Communists there is no race problem; there is only a class 
problem. 
The dictatorship of the State as it developed in Italy 
was consciously formed on the proletarian dictatorship. 
Italian Fascism replaced the class struggle with international 
conflict and hatred, using these as a means of bringing about 
the complete autonomy of the State. Dr. Luigi Sturzo claims 
that Benito Mussolini's notion of the complete subordination 
of man to the State had for Italy the twofold sense of the 
transcendence of the nation and of the resolution of every 
social activity into political power, so that not only was the 
primacy of politics proclaimed on the basis of the State, but 
the latter absorbed into itself every reason of social living 
in that every right came from the State to the individuals. 2 
2 Dr. Luigi Sturzo, "Nationalism," Race: Nation: Person. 
Barnes and Noble, New york, 1944 189=190. 
This conception of Fascism is in complete accord with Musso-
., 
lini's definition: t'Everything is in the State and nothing 
human or spiritual exists, far less has value, outside the 
state. ,,3 
In order to indoctrinate the members of the Fascistic 
state force was not enough; education was also necessary. 
Therefore, Mussolini monopolized the schools, the sport 
activities of the youth, the cinema, the radio, the press, 
the labor alliances, the churches; all these he subordinated 
to the State by organizing them into one party, his party, 
7 
the Fascists' party. Like Communism the Fascist State became 
a philosophy of life that absorbed all values and finally took 
upon itself a religious aspect that expressed a morality 
based on devotion to the State. In 1935 Mussolini wrote: 
I 
The Fascist state, as a higher and 
more powerful expression of person-
ality, is a force, but a spiritual 
one. It sums up all the manifesta-
tions of the moral and intellectual 
life of man. Its functions cannot 
therefore be limited to those of en-
forcing order and keeping the peace, 
as the liberal doctrine had it. It 
is no mere mechanical device for de-
fining the sphere within which the 
individual may duly exercise his 
supposed rights. The Fascist State 
is an inwardly accepted standard 
and rule of conduct, a discipline of 
the whole person; it permeates t~e 
will no less than the intellect. 
3 Loc. cit., note 22. 
4 Benito Mussolini. Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions. 
"Ardita fl Publishers, Rome, 1935, 13 
~ ____ ------------------------------------------------~o 
Fascism became the law-giver, the founder of institutions, 
., 
the educator, and the promoter of spiritual life. "It aims, 11 
- --
Mussolini stated, "at refashioning not only the forms of life 
but their content man, his character, and his faith. To 
achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses authority 
entering into the soul and ruling with undisputed sway."? 
Fascism, as a philosophy, differs from Communism in that 
it must depend upon political unity rather then economic 
unity. Yet this difference has only served to emphasize a 
common difficulty. Communism and Fascism have never succeeded 
on the sociological , and psychological home front, because they 
have been forc·ed to abandon individual interests for the sake 
of the class or State. Their essential problem has been "how 
to transform the mechanized dehumanized mass population of an 
industrialized State into a true community with a common ethos 
and a common faith. ,,6 The philosophies of these two total-
itarian groups have disregarded the differentiating marks 
of their individual members; they have both disregarded 
racial characteristics and have thereby suffered the "spiri-
tual tl loss of their people. The National Socialists were 
more logical, and philosophically more successful; they de-
veloped a more ideal form of totalitarian philosophy; they 
copied the corporative structure of the State from Italian 
5 Ibid., 14 
6 Christopher Dawson. Beyond Politics. Sheed and Ward, New 
York, 1939, 80. 
Fascism and then added .the myth of the race as its crowning 
glory. 
Racism is a race-centric totalitarianism; it makes racial 
origin the sole right to admission into the society of ,the 
chosen people; it holds racial purity as the summum bonum of 
human existence. Thus, in the racist society there is only 
one important problem: the preservation of the pure racial 
traits in the individual members. Racism has been generally 
adopt~d as the philosophy of private persons who have never 
been able to see ~t fully developed in an entire community or 
nation. In Germany, however, racism became identified with 
the political doctrines of the ruling Nazi party; later it 
developed as a "fo1kish philosophy" that overshadowed every 
aspect of German life. 
In 1935, Dr. J. Goebbe1s, the Nazi minister of propa-
ganda, wrote, "National Socialism has simplified thinking 
for the German nation and brought it back to its earlier and 
primitive form.,,7 The meaning of his words is evident to 
the most casual observer of Nazi philosophy in action. The 
theory of racial purity simplified for the Nazis not only 
their thinking but every phase of their national life. No 
one has described more accurately the principles of Nazi 
7 Dr. Joseph Goebbe1s, Wesen und Gestalt des Naziona1sozial-
ismus. Berlin, 1935, 6; quoted by Andrew J. Krzesinski, "The 
Church and National Cultures," in Race: Nation: Person, 149. 
~------------------~ 
philosophy than Alfred Rosenberg; his principal theoIY is 
that all goodness comes from Aryan purity as revealed in the 
8 German race. In his Der My thus des XX. Jahrhunderts he 
states: 
••• what we today call science is 
the most outstandin§ creation of 
the German race ••• Law is that 
which Aryan men consider to be 
just •••• The God whom we worship 
would not exist at all if our 
soul and our blood did not exist • 
••• Today this inner voice demands 
that the Myth of the Blood and 
the Myth of t he Soul, rae e and I, 
people and personality, blood and 
honor must alone, to the exclu-
sion of all e1se, be uncompromis-
ingly upheld and affirmed as long 
as we have life in us •••• Today 
we see a new faith revealed to 
life, the myth of the blood. It 
is the religion of the blood that 
will replace wonderfully well the 
old sacraments, which it has al-
ready succeeded largely in sup-
planting. 9 
The race theory of Nazism, therefore, is simplified to a wor-
ship of the tlpure blooded man. tI The moral values of Dr. Rosen 
berg's philosophy constitute an eternal principle that makes 
right whatever it touches, and it touches every phase of Ger-
, 
man culture. William Stapel brought forward this theory 
with equal force and clarity when he wrote, tlHuman society 
8 The original meaning of"Aryan was "nobleman" or "member of 
the upper castes." In the Nazi vocabulary it was taken to 
mean "highest type of Caucasian. 11 
9 Race: Nation: Person, 9, 10, 12, 143, 313 
1s naturally based on inequality. The champion of the New 
., 
power must be Germany •••• We are above all other., parallel 
;" to none.. We are the Germans •••• If two Germans live in all 
~ 
poland, they will be worth more than thirty million Poles, 
for they are Germans. lflO 
To accompany Rosenberg's "bible of Nazism" Adolph Hitler 
wrote his practical handbuch, Mein Kampf. Here the theories 
of race philosophy are put into an emotional, pleading lan-
guage that has as its purpose the transfer of thought into 
action. Here Nazi philosophy is put on the common-folk level. 
Hitler begins with the premise that "the deepest and the ul-
timate cause for the ruin of the old Reich was found in the 
non-recognition of the race problem and its importance for 
the historical development of the peopl~."ll From this the-
ory Hitler gives the reason for his building a new nation of 
"pure blooded" Aryans whose motto must be "Race alone counts." 
Hitler's very words speak for themselves, "All that is not 
race in this world is trash. All world historical events, 
however, are only the expression of the races' instinct of 
self-preservation in its good or in its evil meaning.,,12 
And again, "Everything in this wo~ld can be improved ••• as 
10 Quoted by Monseigneur Bressolles. Racisme et Christianisme. 
Flammarion, Ed., 26 rue Racine, Paris, 1939, 45. 
11 Adolph Hitler. Mein Kampf, t~anslated by John Chamberlain 
et al. Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1939, 388. 
12 Ibid., 406 
12 
long as the blood remains preserved in purity. Alone the loss 
., 
of purity of the blood destroys the inner happiness forever; it 
eternally lowers man and never again can its consequences be 
removed from body and mind. 1t13 The reason he gives for exalt-
ing racial purity above all else is that Providence has willed 
it so and Nature has proven it over and over.14 According to 
Hitler this exaltation of race is true to such an3extent that 
the distance between the lowest forms that are still called 
human and our highest races is greater than that existing be-
tween the lowest type of human beings and the ape. 15 
The education of the German people, especially the youth, 
must necessarily center attention on racial purity and Aryan 
superiority. Hitler writes~ 
The folkish State's entire work i 
of education and training has some 
day to find its culmination in 
branding, through instinct and rea-
son, the race sense and race feeling 
into the hearts and brains of the 
youth with whom it is entrusted. 
No boy or girl must leave school 
without having been led to the ul-
timate knowledge of the necessity 
and the natgre of the purity of 
the blood. 
The education of the boys must be directed primarily to their 
physical well-being, since it is the physical part that propa-
gates other "pure blooded" members of the Aryan society; the 
13 Ibid., 452 
14 Loc. cit. 
15 Race:~tion: Person, vii, (1) 
16 Hitler, 636, 637 
~_~ __ ------------------------------------------------~13 
f· 
promotion of spiritual and intellectual values is a secondary 
., 
consideration. Analagous with the education of the boys, the 
folkish State must direct the education of the girls; .the goal 
of female education must always be the future mother. 17 In 
practice Nazism is consistent; its action comes straight from 
the heart of its principles. 
A more subtle form of racism than Nazism is the theory of 
white supremacy. It began in Europe but became most widely 
diffused in the United states, where many of its proponents 
still cling to its main principles. In 1853, Joseph Arthur 
de Gobineau wrote his Essai ~.l'inegalite des races humaines, 
a simp'le proof that the Negro was a member of an inferior race 
and therefore necessarily fit for slavery. Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain took hold of Gobineau's theory; later it traversed 
the Atlantic and became the central theme of J. H. Van Evrie, 
Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Major.Shufeldt, Carlyle Mc-
Kinley, Gustavus M. Pinckney, Gene Talmadge, Senator Bilbo; 
and the members of the Ku Klux Klan, the National Association 
for the Preservation of the White Race, the White American So-
ciety, and the Commoner Party, all of which are in the United 
States and supported by Americans. 
According to white-supremists the Caucasian race repre-
sents the highest type of the human family, the Negro race the 
lowest. Their solution of the race question is as simplified 
as that of the National Socialists. In 1868, Dr. J. H. Van 
17 Ibid.!.., 621 
__ --------------------------------------------------~4 
Evrie published his White Supremacy and Negro Subordination, 
., 
or "Negroes, a Subordinate Race, and (So-called) Slavery, Its 
Normal Condition.tI The theme of the author is introduced with 
the words of Dr. Cartwright, " ••• in regard to Negro slavery ••• 
it is no slavery, but a natural relation of 'the races •••• ,,18 
A review of Dr. Van Evrie's sub-chapter headings will give a 
clear picture of the white-supremacy theory: "European Miscon-
ception of the Negro," "False Issue of a Single Human Race,tI 
"The Races Specifically Different from Eaeh Other," "The In-
ferior Races are Incapable of Acquiring and Transmitting Know-
ledge," "The Black Complexion a Sign of Inferiority," The Folly 
and Impiety of Attempting to Equalize Those Whom God has made 
unequal, et6.,,19 Nazi racists said that the distance between 
the lowest forms that are still called human and our highest 
races is greater than that existing between the lowest type of 
human beings and the ape. Dr. Van Evrie has written: 
And the entire bodily structure'of 
the negro, down to the minutest 
atom of elementary matter, differs 
just as widely, of course, as the 
color of the skin or other external 
qualities from those of the white 
man. It is equally palpable to the 
reason that the nature of the negro, 
his instincts, all the faculties of 
his mind, and all the functions of 
his body, are pervaded by the same 
or by relative differences from 
those of the Caucasian •••• 
18 Dr. J. H. Van Evrie. -White Supremacy and ~ Subordina-
tion. Van Evrie, Horton and Co., New York, 18~viii. 
~Ibid., ix-xvi 
~ ____ ----------------------------_1~5 
j Such, then, is the negro -- I 
the lowest in the scale as the 
Caucasian is the most elevated in 
the human creation -- a creature 
not degraded -- for none of God's 
creatures are degraded -- but that 
is widely different and vastly sub-
ordinate to the elaborately organ- 0 
ized and highly endowed white man. 2 
It would be a mistake to suppose that Van Evrie was alone 
in his defense of white-wupremacy. The English essayist, David 
Hume, once wrote, "I am apt to suspect the negroes ••• to be 
naturally inferior to the Whites ••• Such a uniform and constant 
difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if 
nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these 
21 breeds of men. tf Professor Smith of Tulane University: "Now, 
if nature and the tide of time have spent such centuraes of 
centuries in chiseling out this chasm, how infinitely prepos-
terous to suppose that man can close it up in a generation 
with the filmy webs of common culture and social equality and 
civil rights •••• ,,22 Mr. James A. Froude: tIThe equality be-
tween black and white is a forced equality and not a real one, 
and Nature in the long run has her way, and readjusts in their 
proper relations what theorists and philanthropists have dis-
turbed.,,23 Carlyle McKinley: "The two races in America will 
20 Ibid., 134-135, 141 
21 David Hume. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, trOf 
National Characters. Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1875, 
Vol. I, 252, note 1. 
22 William B. Smith. The Color Line. McLure, Philips, and Com-
pany, New York, 1905, 248 ----
23 James A. Froude, The English in the West Indies or The Bow 
of Ulysses. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, l888,~4r-- ---
~ ____ --------------------------------------------------_1~6 
remain apart, in obedience to a law that is so nearly if not 
., 
wholly universal in its operation that we are compelled to re~ 
gard it as a fundamental law of human, nature, and, therefore, 
beyond hope of repeal or evasion."24 
The White-supremist~' answer to the race question rests 
on the philosophical supposition that the white race is super-
ior naturally to the colored races. For these racists the two 
central motives of action are: 1) The colored races must be 
kept in their subordinate position as servants of the white 
race; ~) The purity of the white' race must be zealously pre-
served. 
Besides the white-supremists in the United States there 
has grown up another system'of philosophical thought with to-
talitarian inclinations. In opposition to the anti-totalitar-
ian principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence 
these philosophers would insist that actually the Declaration 
is an outmoded,9.ocument no longer in agreement with modern 
thought. They would change one clause of the Declaration to 
read, "that all men are made equal under the State, that they 
are endowed by the State with certain State-given rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. tI 
This major premise of totalitarian philosophy is still in the 
class-room stages in the United States. An example of this 
24 Carlyle McKinley. An Appeal to Pharaoh. The State Company 
Columbia: S.C., 1907, 91." (Vd. "Organization Plan of The Common 
er Party of the United States of America," Commoner Party Na-
tional Headquarters, Cpn,yers, Georgia, 1946.) 
~ ____ ----------------------__________________ 1~7 
school of thought is found in Harold Faulkner I s history text-
book: 
Viewed from the high, point of I 
twentieth century historical and 
ethnological research, the Dec-
laration is not wholly convincing. 
Only in a limited sense, if at all, 
have men ever been created equal, 
nor are they endowed with any 
rights, except those they can 
obtain and hold, nor were govern-
ments, in spite of certain Ameri-
can precedents, originated to se-
cure these 'inalienable rights. I If 25 
Here is totalitarian philosophy at least in germ; the future 
of its program will depend on its acceptance or rejection out-
side the class room. 
Other thinkers whose doctrines affect the ,problem of 
Negro-White relationships in the United States may be listed 
as the irrationalists and the social philosophers. The first 
group consists of the anti-spiritual scientists and the a-
spiritual psychologists. 
Some scientists today deny the reality of a spiritual 
order, and therefore of an intellectual order in man. Some of 
these are logical enough to keep out of the realm of philos-
ophy altogether; others try to make the deduction that matter 
alone is capable of existing because nothing outside of matter 
25 Harold U. Faulkner. American Political and Social History. 
Croft and Company, New York, 1941, 2nd edition, 97. 
can be experienced by men. 26 The findings of an absolutely 
., 
materialistic science were systematized into .the form of a 
18 
theory propounded by Charles Darwin, the theory of evolution 
of organic species through natural selection. 27 In the name 
of this same science a more modern materialist (and more avid 
anti-intellectualist and anti-spiritualist), John Dewey, put 
the final touches to the philosophy of irrationalism; he at-
tacked every traditional belief by seeking a freedom against 
reason; he gave man only one life, that of servitude to phy-
sical nature. 28 Thus, for the materialistic scientists race 
is only one way of claasifying different animal types. Their 
answer to ·~·the race question is founded on men I s identity in 
common animality. 
, 
26 To explain W¥f natural scientists have readily taken to a 
mate~ialistic ph osophy is not a difficult task. In the past 
century enormous progress has been made in the investigation 
and interpretation of material nature, and the investigators 
and interpreters have been convinced tht.t this must be all 
that exi.gts. The biologists, for example, have labored over 
that part of man .in which he is not essentially different from 
the other animals. Prog~ess in medicine has been made by ex-
periments with brute animals and then later applied to men. 
It is thus explainable why scientists have concluded that if 
the blood circulation and digestive processes of men are not 
essentially different from those of·the other animals then 
man is·not different from other animals in his nature. They 
become anti-spiritual, because they formulate the principle 
that the real is coextensive with the sensible. 
27 Charles Darwin. The Origin of Species ~ Means of Natu-
ral Selection. D. Appleton and 0"0., New York, 1907 
~is significant to note that Karl Marx regarded Darwin's 
theory as "the greatest scientific discovery of all time: the 
key to all human progress and history." Vd. Race: Nation: 
Person, 135. -- ----
28 Race: Nation: Person, 87 
~_" __ ----------------------------n-~--~l~ 
In line with this irrationalist philosophy has arisen a 
.. 
school of psychology that has taken the monistic philosophy of 
Hegel and Spinoza29 and developed a philosophy of tfuniversal 
parallelism. tt G.T. Fechner, the father of experimen~al psy-
chology proposed the theory of "psYChophsical, parallelism, It 
which assumes a strict co-ordination of bodily and mental 
phenomena so ,that to each phenomenon of the "bodilytl series 
there corresponds one of the "mental "~r,series, both of which 
are due to a kind of "pre-established harmony. ,,30 Fechner's 
theory was adopted by Fried:t"ich Paulsen and later applied to 
animals, plants, and minerals, so that the whole world be-
came "one vast animal animated by a single world-soul.,,3l 
The relations of men in this world-soul depend on their phy-
sical or psychical a-spiritual participation in that soul, 
which alone gives meaning to men's existerice. 
Various social philosophers have espoused a novel theory 
that has a direct bearing on the problem of race relations. 
This ttSocial Contract" theory began is Jean Jacques Rous-
seau's declaration of the sovereignty of the people or of 
29 Spinoza made the pantheistic (or monistic) idea of God or 
Nature the fundamental thesis of his system. Hegel went a 
step further by identifying reality with ideality. According 
to Dr. O'Toole, "This absolute Idea proceeds in eternal self-
movement from itself to become Nature and then, reverting to 
itself, becomes self-conscious Spirit in Humanity •••• The in-
dividual mind, the 'subjective spirit', is a lower manifesta-
tion of the Absolute than the forms of the 'objective spirit' 
among which the state is the highest." Ibid., 297. 
30 Ibid., 299. ----
31 Ibid., 232-242. 
, . 4 ;:'3 i~?~ij.% 
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society Absolutism,32 which has subsequently become the key-
~ 
stone of a social philosophy that places every solution of a 
social problem in the capitalization of Society or Humanity. 
Rousseau explained his theory thus: 
If the State or City is nothing 
but a moral person, the life of 
which consists in the union of 
its members, and if the most im-
portant of its cares is that of 
self-preservation, it needs a 
universal and compulsive force 
to move and dispose every part 
in the manner most expedient for 
the whole. As nature gives every 
man an absolute power over all his 
limbs, the soc ial pac t gives the 
body politic an absolute power 
over all its members; and it is 
this same power which, when di-
rected by the general will, bears, 
as I ~aid, the name of sovereign-
ity.35 
Rousseau made the only truly living reality, existing in it-
self and for itself, Society, the tl one substance" to which 
individuals are subordinated, and in which human personalities 
are submerged. For August Comte society became lithe most 
vital of known beings"; for M. Fouillee, a great "physiolo-
gical individual tl ; For E. Durkheim society was all, as he 
wrote "Man is a man only because he lives in society •••• It is 
32 "By absolutism is meant any theory of supreme, unlimited, 
irresponsible power vested in the government of a State, such 
that all individual liberties are extinguished by the consti-
tution of an omnipotent civil authority to whose will and 
sovereignity there is no limit.fI Ibid., 243 
33 Jean Jacques Rousseau. Social-contract, II, 4 in Ideal 
Empires and Republics. William H. Wise Co., New York, 1901, 
25. 
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society that forms the human type.,,34 According to these so-
., 
clal philosophies the racial characteristics of men are lost 
; 
in society in the same way as they are in the Communistic and 
Fascistic communities; here Society replaces Class and State 
as an absolute. Here the r ace question is answered by an un-
derstanding of men's common identity as members of Society. 
A second group of soci~l philosophers has been intensely 
interested in social problems and has presented their solu-
tions in a manual, The City of Man, ~ Declaration on World 
Democracy.35 This group is especially concerned with the 
problem of race relations; they claim that the "Negro himself, 
with whom our failure was most inglorious, helps us by re-
minding us that our slow progress is a mere token of the jus-
tice we pledge -- until all races rise to equal i ty in matur";' '. 
ity.,,36 The purpose of the group, therefore, is to show how 
all races will rise to "equality in maturity," and why "the 
emergency of democracy must be the emergence of democracy.,,37 
In order to make way for a true understanding of the 
equality of all races of men in the United States, 
a new foundation, then, must be 
34 Race: Nation: Person, 226. 
35 The City of Man, A Declaration £Q World Democracy. The 
Viking Press, New york, 1941. This book was the result of the 
combined efforts of Herbert Agar, Frank Aydelotte, G. A. Bor-
gese, Hermann Broch, Van Wyck Brooks, Ada L. Comstock, William 
Yandell ,Elliott, Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Christian Gauss, 
Oscar Jaszi, Alvin Johnson, Hans Kohn, Thomas Mann, Lewis Mum-
ford, William Allen Neilson, Reinhold Niebuhr, Gaetano Sa1ve-
36 Ib ., 69 mini. 
37 ., 67 
laid for a new democracy -- in 
the firm rock of conviction, deep 
below the moving sand of opinion. 
And the concept of a vital demo-
cracy must be dissociated from the 
notion of a disintegrated liberal-
ism, which is a precu§sor of tyran-
nyand a prey to it. 3 
22 
Democracy, therefore, must be redefined. tlDemocracy is noth-
ing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and 
rational theocracy in universal humanism. tl39 Contrary to the 
Fascistic teaching that everything must be within the State, 
"Democracy teaches that everything must be within humanity, 
nothing against humanity, nothing outside humanity. ,,40 The 
"Social Contract theory" has been revised to fit "modern" 
needs. These social philosophers want their humanitarian 
autocracy to oppose totalitarian a~tocracy without at the 
same time becoming totalitarian. Thus, everything must be 
measured according. to the standard set by Democracy, "since 
democracy alone combines the fundamental characteristics of 
law, equality, and justice.,,4l "In broad terms the task here 
is to determine what religious and ethical traditions are of 
greater o~ lesser value for the preservation and growth of 
the democratic principle. tf42 
How all races will rise to tlequality in maturity" is les.s 
evident than the fundamental principles which determine this 
------------
38 Ibid. , 31 
39 Ibid. , 33 
40 Ibid. , 34 
41 Ibid. , 28 
42 Ibid. 81 
rr plan for equality. First, Americans must realize the prima 
.. principia of democracy: "Everything within humanity, nothing 
against humanity, nothing outside humanity. If .Secondly, they 
must adopt the universal religion of the Spirit, to which all 
men are witnesses: 
This is -- in an interpretation 
suited to the modern mind -- the 
spirit whic~ Christ called the 
Holy Ghost. 3 
This common creed already 
exists; toward its luminous cen-
ter all higher minds already 
point, from whatever distant hori-
zon they may set out. The yoke of 
the creed is as easy as it is in-
evitable •••• It teaches that a di-
vine intention governs the universe 
-- be it called God or Deity or the 
Holy Ghost or the Absolute or Logos 
or even Evolution •••• It teaches 
that in the universe we know the 
human species is the !Eearhead of 
the divine intention. 
Thirdly, all people must participate in government to assure 
the rule of the strongest and wisest, who will be themselves 
the champions of humanity. Lastly, the State must always re-
main the hand-maid of humanity, the servant of the common 
good, because the unity of the people is the permanent source 
of power behind those who temporarily -hold it.45 
Why the emergence of Democracy must renew the face of 
the earth comes from the very meaning of Democracy and its 
"intrinsic opposition" to totalitarianism. "It is univer-
43 Ibid., 35 
44 Ibid., 47 
4 Ibid. 29 
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sality we oppose to totalitariani.sm, republican unity to au-
., 
tarchic despotism, service in brotherhood to regimentation in 
serfdom.,,46 The world has been thrown into the chasm of Tyr-
anny; a new world must arise as the City of Man, which will 
be the source of man, his dignity, his rights. Here then we 
have Human Absolutism replacing State and Class and Race Ab-
solutism, humanity redeemed by Humanity. 
The third group of social philosophers is typified by Dr. 
Gunnar Myrdal, professor in the University of Stockholm and 
member of the Swedish Senate, who was invited by the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York in 1937 to come to the United States 
and make a comprehensive study of the Negro-White problem. 
Dr. Myrdal accepted. In 1944 the complete expose of his 
findings was published in a two volume work, An American Dil-
emma. Here we have the most generally accepted authoritative 
study of the race question. But we are primarily interested 
in Dr. Myrdal's survey in the light of its philosophical con-
tent, that is, in so far as it offers the ultimate answer to 
the question. 
In his introduction Dr. Myrdal gives the philosophical 
basis for 'discussing his social data; thus, the first 'part of 
the introduction bears the title, liThe Negro Problem as a 
~/I'oral Issue. It But before anyone can disagree with a sociol-
ogist's trespassing into the field of philosophy, Dr. Myrdal 
hastens to state: 
46 Ibid., 25 
In approaching the Negro problem 
as primarily a moral issue of con- ~ 
flicting valuations, it is not im-
plied, of course, that ours is the 
prerogative of pronouncing on ~ pri-
ori grounds which values are Ifright" 
and which are "wrong." In fact, such 
judgments are out of the realm of 
social science, and will not be at-
tempted in this inquiry. Our in-
vestigation will naturally be an an-
alysis of morals and not in morals. 
In so far as we make our own judg-
ments of value, they will be based 
on ex-rlicitly stated value premises, 
selected rrom among those valuations 
actually observed as existing in the 
minds of the white and Negro Americans 
and tested as to their social and poli-
tical relevance and significance. Our 
value judgments are thus derived and 
have not greater validity 4ban the 
value premises postulated. 7 
This is an important statement; it admits objectivity in re-
cording subjective "valuations actually observed as existing 
in the minds of the white and Negro Americans." It gives Dr. 
Myrdal freedom to express boldly the problem as he sees it, 
without having to posit unsociologically any fundamental 
"first principles." Thus, when Dr. Myrdal speaks of a "moral 
issue,1f of "fundamental beliefs," ideals of essential dig-
nity," etc., he does not mean to imply that he even knows 
that such things really and objectively exist as such, but 
that he is merely indicating what·Americans, taken in globo, 
generally refer to as their "American heritage." Dr. Uyrdal 
47 Dr. Gunnar Myrdal. An American Dilemma. Harper and Bro-
thers, New York, 1944, xlvi-xlvii. 
~iS writing for all Americans; he wishes to combine all their 
? -
., 
various philosophies into a harmonious, universal creed, some-
what like the one presented by the City of Man humanists. 
Dr. Myrdal explains what he means by "The Negro Problem 
as a Moral Issue~: 
'Though our study includes economic, 
social, and political race rela-
tions, at bottom our problem is the 
moral dilemma of the American -- the 
conflict between his moral valua-
tions on various levels of conscious-
ness and generality. The "American 
.Dilemma ll referred to in the title of 
this book is the ever-raging conflict 
between, on the one hand, the valua-
tions preserved on the general plane 
which we shall call the tfAmerican 
Creed," where the American thinks, 
talks, and acts under the influence 
of high national and Christian pre-
cepts, and, on the other hand, the 
valuations on specific planes of 
individual and group living, where 
personal and local interests; eco-
nomic, social and sexual jealousies; 
considerations of community pres-
tige and conformity; group preju-
dice against particular persons or 
types of people; and all sorts of 
miscellaneous wants, impulse~~ and 
habits dominate his outlook. 0 
He further states that the moral struggle goes on within 
people, and that their behaviour normally becomes a moral 
compromise when their valuations are in conflict. The strug-
gle is between the American's devotion to the American Creed 
and his natural feelings: reason against emotion; spirit 
48 Ibid., xliii. 
~~--------------~ 
against flesh. And the average American, has, concerning this 
., 
problem of the races, compormised the Creed. This, then, is 
the psychological aspect of the answer. What will be the more 
basic, the ontological answer? 
The ultimate norm of morality, as Dr. ~"'yrdal sees it re-
flected in American thought, is adherence to the American 
creed, which, accordingly, must be ultimum atque summum. In 
defining the Creed he says: 
I 
These ideals of the essential dignity 
of the individual human being, of the 
fundamental equality of all men, and of 
certain inalienable rights to freedom, 
justice, and a fair opportunity repre-
sent to the American people the essen-
tial meaning of the nation's early 
struggle for independence. In the 
clarity and intellectual boldness of 
the Enlightenment period these tenets 
were written into the Declaration of 
Independence, the Preamble of the Con-
stitution, the Bill of Rights and into 
the constitutions of the several states. 
The ideals of the American Creed have 
thus ~~come the highest law of the 
land. ':J 
The ttideological roots of the American Creed" are explained 
as 1) European philosophy of Enlightenment, i.e. the French 
eighteenth century humanitarianism and equalitarianism, rep-
resented by Rousseau, and the English seventeenth century 
liberalism, represented by John Locke; 2) Christianity, es-
pecially Protestant Christianity as seen in the lower class 
sects; 3) English law with its democratic concepts of law and 
---------------
49 Ibid., 4 
order and its philosophical ideas of human equality~nd in-
alienable rights. Dr. Myrdal summarizes his discussion by 
saying that 
for practical purposes the main 
norms of the American Creed as 
usually pronounced are centered 
in the belief in equality and in 
the rights of liberty •••• a human-
istic liberalism developing out of 
the epoch of Enlightenment when 
America received its national con-
sciousness and its political struc-
ture. The Revolution did not stop 
short of anything less than the 
heroic desire for the "emancipa-
tion of human nature. tt50 
Ii JA44 
The United states cannot claim this creed as her own monopoly; 
rather must it be considered "the common democratic creed as 
it matured in. our common Western civilization. tl51 
The answer to the question of Negro-White relationships 
will depend upon the American's ability to follow his belief 
in the American Creed, "which is firmly rooted in Americans' 
hearts.,,5~ Dr. Myrdal asserts that there is reason to be-
lieve that most Americans will succeed in overcoming this 
"moral dilemma," because tithe trend of psychology, education, 
anthropology, and social science is toward environmentalism in 
the explanation of group differences, which means that the 
racial beliefs which defended caste are being torn away •••• 
Authority and respectibility are no longer supporting the 
50 Ibid., 8 
51 Ibid., 25 
52 Ibid., 1010 
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popular beliefs. "53 Furthermore, 
it is significant today even the 
white man who defends discrimi-
nation frequently describes his 
motive as "prejudice" and says 
that it is It irrational." The. 
popular beliefs rationalizing 
caste in America are no longer 
intellectually respectable •••• 
There is today a queer feeling 
of creao quia absurdum hovering 
over the whole complex of popu-
lar beliefs sustaining racial 
discrimination. This makes the 
prejudiced white man nearly as 
pathetic as his Negro victim. 54. 
According to Dr. Myrdal it is the singular task of democracy 
lito determine what religious and ethical traditions are of 
greater or lesser value for the preservation a.nd growth of 
the democratic principle."55 Here humanity is redeemed by 
Democracy. 
All the "other answers" to the race question have been 
outlined as objectively as possible. We will now present the 
Scholastic answer. In a later chapter we will judge the 
value of the "other answers" in the light of true philoso-
nhical principles. 
r ... ·_--------------~ ,. '~',' 
CHAPTER II 
PRELUDE TO THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER 
In beginning the Scholastic answer to the question of 
Negro-White relationships we must insist on the primacy of 
philosophy in the sphere of human knowledge. Every human 
question must be first of all a philosophical question; the 
social question of race relations is no exception. All action 
directed to the solution of social problems proceeds from the 
philosophical principles that determine the purpose and mode 
of that action. These prin~iples, then, are the sources from 
which comes progression in every human endeavor, whether it 
be purely speculative or practical. 
Scholastic philosophy begins with ontology, the science 
of being, or "first philosophy, tt as Aristotle calls it. This. 
science is "first 11 because it abstracts from t he material and 
even from the quantitative aspect of being and penetrates to 
the tlbeingness" of all things. Although the immediate object 
of knowledge is the essence existing in the material, mutable 
thing of everyday contact, the mature mind clarifies t he im-
mediate object by accentuating its existential element and 
thereby arriving at the underlying reality that gives the 
thing its being. From this science of ontology comes order 
30 
in both speculative and practical knowledge. Jacques Maritain 
., 
says that ontology reveals to man "the hierarchy of authentic 
values through all the extent of being. It gives a center to 
hiS ethics. It maintains justice in the universe of knowledge, 
making clear the natural limits, the harmony and subordination 
of various sciences ...... l Just as social action will depend 
on the philosophical principles that direct it, so philosophy 
will depend on its ontology; from this basic science will rise 
up the super-structure of philosophy; through it all knowledge 
is given the objectivity that makes it to be true. 
Since our problem here is one dealing with the human 
actions of men, it is an ethical problem. Ethics or moral 
philosophY is that science concerned with the rightness of 
human actions as known from their ultimate causes and through 
the light of natural reason. Therefore, after establishing a 
firm foundation in ontology we must set up an ultimate prin-
ciple in ethics, which will at once proceed from the objective 
reality of being and lead to a true as well as efficient so-
ciology. The Scholastic answer begins with the ontological or 
metaphys ical foundation -- the dignity «tfr the human person 
then wes~nts the moral or ethical principle -- the doctrine 
of human rights. Taken together the basic foundation and the 
ultimate principle form the complete Scholastic answer. 
1 Jacques Maritain. The Degrees of Knowledge. Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, New York, 1938, 5. 
r-· ------------------~ 
We offer the. Scholastic answer, not because it has been 
., 
mainly the answer of St. Thomas Aquinas,2 nor because any hu-
man or even divine authority has suggested this answer, but 
simply and practically because it ist he only true and ulti-
mate answer. Our dependence on the philosophy of St~ Thomas 
in noway vitiates the reasonableness of our ~rguments. We 
follow him not because he is St. Thomas Aquinas but because he 
is a "herald of Truth.1f It would be the height of inconsis-
tency for us to appeal to his authority as a basis for the 
acceptability of our arguments., for he above all distrusted 
human authority as worthy of argumentative use. 3 He respected 
human authority but he was devoted to Truth. It is this de-
votion we wish to imitate and exemplify here -- in the Scho-
lastic answer. 
Finally, we must postulate in our presentation the neces-
sary existence of ~personal and provident God, who is the 
First Cause and the Final End of all that has being. These 
facts rieed philosophical proof and it can be found in the 
2 Our answer is called Scholastic in reference to the spirit 
of medieval philosophy that was integrated into a systematic 
whole by St. Thomas Aquinas. Through the metonymous use of 
Scholasticism as the title of St. Thomas t philo·sophy he now 
stands as the Scholastic. The Scholastic answer, then, will 
be St. Thomas' answer, although there have been other Scho-
lastics, in the less strict sense of the term, who have dis-
agreed with St. Thomas' philosophical conclusions. 
3 St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica,I, 1,8 ad 2. Domus 
Editorialis Marietti, editio XXII, 1939: "Nam li~et locus ab 
auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana, sit infir-
missimus •••• 11 
writings of st. Thomas. Here we must presuppose the validity 
and cogency of that proof. 4 
., 
4 ~., I, 2; 8; 12; 22; 44; 45; 46; 103;104; 105. 
r 7 '--------------------..., 
CHAPTER III 
THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: METAPHYSICAL 
Since we are beginning Ii!. study that concerns the inter-
relations of men in society, we must have a complete and in-
tegral idea about men. To have this we must strip them of all 
material and quantitative values; we· must study the essential 
meaning not of men, but of ~.l Once we have understood man, 
then we will be able to study men. Jacques l\~aritain writes 
that this idea of man is "not entirely \rerifiable in sense-
experience, though it possesses criteria and proofs of its 
---------~-------
I The metaphysical concept·of man that we are considering 
here must not be identified with Plato's or Aristotle's doc-
trines. Etienne Gilson has fully expressed the Platonic and 
Aristotelian;;.approaches: "In a doctrine like Plato's it is 
not at all this Socrates, however highly extolled he may be, 
that matters; it is Man. If Socrates has anY'importance at all 
it is only because he is an exceptionally happy, but at the 
same time quite accidental, participation in the being of an 
Idea. The idea of Man is eternal, immutable, necessary; Soc-
rates, like all other individuals, is only a temporarw and ac-
cidental being; he partakes of the unreality of his matter, 
in which the permanence of the idea is reflected and his mere-
ly momentary being flows away on the stream of·becoming •••• In 
the system of Aristotle the unreality and accidental character 
of the individual physical being as compared with the neces-
sity of the pUre acts and·the E?ternlty of species are no less 
evident. Aristotle's world is certainly a very different one 
from Plato's, since the Ideas, far from constituting the typi-
cal reality are now refused all proper subsistence. In Aris-
totle's philosophy t~e universal is far from nothing, but it 
never enjoys the privilege of subsistence, only particulars 
can properly be said to exist; and it is therefore only just 
to say that the reality of the individual is much more strong-
ly marked in his doctrine than it is in Plato's. Nevertheles~, 
in both, the universal 1s the important thing." The Spirit of 
Mediaeval Philosophy. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940, 
190-191. 34 
r----~----~----------~--------------~--~-,. 
own, and it deals with the essential and intrinsic, though not 
~ 
visible or tangible characters, and with the intelligible den~ 
sity of that being which we call man."2 The things we will 
want to know about him are: Who is he? What is He? Whence 
is he? Why is he? A reply to each of these questions will 
form the basic foundation for a true understanding of our 
problem. 
To discover who man is, we must first know the full mean-
ing of being and then of man's participation in being. What-
ever we grasp mentally, we grasp as being; every concept that 
we use in order to arrive at knowledge of reality presupposes 
the concept of being. As to content, it is found in every-
thing; it transcends all ge~era and species, which consequent~ 
ly represent certain particularizations of being. Yet in 
order to understand fully the idea of abstract being, we must 
analyze the concrete reality from which the idea of being 
arises. This concrete reality proclaims its being to our 
senses in the existence of individual things. All nature and 
all the processes of nature are designed fori-the production 
and sustenance of individual things, which thus become the 
, 
material object of the natural sciences, as well as the Bub-
ject of a scientific research which seeks to penetrate to the 
2 Jacques Maritain. Education at the CroBsroads. Yale Unl-
vers i ty Press, New Haven, 1943, .5." 
rr ) principles of being. 3 To get at the nature of being as visibl 
41 
in individual things philosophers have proffered many dif-
ferent doctrines. The Pythagoreans thought that numbers were 
the only true being. 4 For Empedocles the natural elements of 
fire, air, earth, and water were the irreducibles. 5 Plato 
turned to his universe of Ideas. 6 Aristotle, rooted as he was 
in empiric reality, taught that the individual was true being, 
and that every individual thing subject to change was composed 
of two parts~ matter and form. 7 For" him the matter is the ba-
sis for the reception of the form, through which the matter 
has existence. Father Meyer summarizes Aristotle's conclu-
sion: "I call matter substance in the sense that it is pos-
sible; I call the form substance in the sense that it is real, 
and the individual thing I call substance in the sense that 
is composed of matter and form. 1t8 In st. Thomas' writings we 
find the same declaration that the individual thing is true 
reality, and thet erm, substance, belongs primarily to the 
individual,9 which he defines as "in itself undivided, but 
3 Hans Meyer. The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated 
by Rev. Frederic Eckhoff. B. Herder Book Company, st. Louis, 
1944, 58. 
4 William Turner. History of Philosophy. Ginn and Company, 
New York, 1903, 40. . 
5 Ibid., 58-59 
6 Ibid., 100-105. 
7 IbId., 137-139. 
8 Meyer. OPe cit., 98 (MetaPhYsics VIII, 1, 3; VII, 4, 17.) 
9 Summa, 1, 29, 2 ad 4, 5. 
~ 7 
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distinct from others."lO Thus the individual is called first 
., 
substance, in contrast to second substances which,havecexis-
tence only in some respect or because of a relation to the , 
first substance.ll The first substance is independent of 
other beings for its subsistence; thus it may be call~ sub-
ject, suppositum, hypostasis, or merely subsistence.12 
To determine how individuals differ from one another we 
must distinguish their differences~ Each being of which we 
have direct knowledge in the present life has certain evident 
traits which it shares with other individuals that cbp~ely 
resemble it; at the same time each being has other marks pro-
per to itself alone., The common notes, called "specific char-
acters"are manifested in ali the members of a species; the 
proper notes o.r "individual differences, tf in the individuals 
alone.. To' find the ultimate reason for these individual dif-
ferences St. Thoma~ recalled Aristotlets division of substance 
into matter and, form. 13 He knew that the form, the basis of 
the substantial essence, could not be the basis of individual-
ity because the form in itself is universal and can be receive 
10 Ibid., 1, 29,4: It ••• quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis 
vero distinctum. tt English translations of ' the Summa are (unles 
otherwise noted) taken from Basic Writings of St. ~homas tgui-
nas, edited by Anton C. Pegis. Random House, New York, 19 5. 
11 St. Thomas Aquinas. In VII Metaphysica, 1, 2. ~ 
12 Summa, 1, 29, 2. 
13 By definition, form 1s that by which a being has existence; 
it is an active principle that confers on a thing a cert~in 
kind of being with specific properties. Matter, on the other 
hand, is the substratum from which, as from a co-principle, 
every being takes its origin; it is passive, indefinite, un-
determined. The individual thing is a substance composed of 
matter and form. 

that of its form, which is the source of substantiality, then 
., 
the individual owes more to the form than to matter. 
All that has been said about being and individual can now 
be applied to the subject of our discussion -- man. Man is 
an individual, but not in the same sense that a tulip or a 
kangaroo is an individual. He is something more; he is a per-
son, which is defined by St. Thomas (in accordance with Boe-
thius' famous definition) as "an individual substance endowed 
wi th reason. tl19 After approving this definition of person, St • 
.. 
Thomas immediately puts to use Aristotle's principles·of matter 
and form: Man is composed not of matter alone nor of form 
alone, but of matter actualized by a form. Body (matter) and 
soul (form) belong to the nature of man; this body and this 
soul b~long to the nature of this man. 20 Lest his definition 
of person seem to raise man to a level higher than his nature 
warrants, st. T~omas notes that, although person in general 
signifies the individual substance of a rational nature, per-
son in any.nature signifies what is distinct in that nature; 
\ 
thus in human nature it signifies body and soul, which do not 
belong to person in general but to the !meaningof a human 
person. 21 Now by comparing man with all other earthly beings, 
we see ,that he alone fulfills the definition of a person, he 
alone is endowed with reason. And since it is the form -- the 
19 Summa, I, 29, 1 ad 1: "Persona est rationalis naturae in-
dividua substantia. fI 
20 Ib id., I , 29 ,2 ad 3. 
21 Ibid., l,29, 4. 
soul -- that bestows being on matter -- the body --, we may 
., 
rightly say that man is a person because of his soul; his 
rationality is the root principle of his personality.22 Sinc9C:': 
his rationality lies at the basis of the subsistence of his 
soul and, therefore, of himself, we may further say that the 
principle of h~s individuality and the principle of his person 
ality come back in the end to the aame thing. As Etienne Gil-
son puts it, "The actuality of the reasonable soul, in com-
municating itself to the body, determines the existence of a.n 
individual who is a person, so that the individual soul po-
ssesses personality as by definition.tta~ As it is the form 
that enables the indivtdual to subsist, so is it the rational 
soul that enables man to exist as a human person. It is the 
soul of man that gives him dignity. 
Tracing back the origin of the word, tlperson," St. Thomas 
agrees with Boethius that the word originally referred to the 
I 
masks. (i1'fo~(j)~ worn by actors in comedies and tragedies; 
then he adds: 
For as famous men were represented 
in comedies and tragedies, the name 
person. was given to signify those 
who held high dignity. Hence, those 
who held high rank in the Church 
came to be called persons. Hence, 
some definite person as a. hypos-
tasis distinct Bl reason of dignity. 
22 Again we must emphasize and maintain strictly the non-
individuality of the soul as ,soul, since two forms of this 
kind which would be numerically distinct as forms, would seem 
incapable of mutual existence. 
23 Q.E. cit., 202. 
~::' ~ " ~ r-
~ 
And because subsistence in a rational 
nature is of high dignity, ,therefore 
every individual of a rational nature 
is called a person. 24 
The intrinsic relation of t'dignityff and "human person" clearly 
manifests itself. According to its definition, "dignity" 
means "the state, character, or quality of being worthy or 
honorable; elevation of character; intrinsic worth; nobleness; 
excellence." Dignity is a recognition of someone's worthiness, 
of inner qualities that demand to be honored. Human dignity 
is intrinsic to man; it comes from his nature his personal 
nature, as St. Thomas understood and defined it. This same 
dignity will be known through the operations characteristic 
of a rational be ing,. that is, through thought and the exerc ise 
of free will. 
The, way has been prepared for the second question, ttWhat 
is man? tf The acts of intell ectual cognition ahd will-power 
that are natural to man must find their proportionate cause in 
some concrete principle, real, and consequently subsisting in 
a determinate nature. When there are acts of thought and of 
will there are thinking and wi.11ing substances, call them 
24 Summa, 1,29, 3 ad 2: "Quia enim in comoediis et tragoedli 
~epraesentabantur aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc 
nomen, persona, ad signifieandum aliquoa dignitatem habentes. 
Unde consueverunt dici personae in Ecclesiis, quae habent ali-, 
quam dignitatem. Propter quod quidamdefinlunt personam, di-
centes quod 'persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad 
dlgnitatem pertinente.' Et quia magnae dignitatis est in ra-
tionali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis 
naturae dieitur persona, ut dietum est. tt 
rr···· " ,h whatever we wiSh. According to Thomist terminology they are 
~ 
intellect {intellectus) and will (voluntas), which are the 
~ from which the actio of man's rationality flows; conse-
quently, the nature of the rational faculties will determine 
the nature of the rational operations. Yet it will be easier~ 
for us to study first the operations, in order to get at' the 
full meaning of the faculties, themselv~s, which, according to 
St. Thomas, are the only two faculties of the soul,25 which is 
in truth the informing principle of the human person. 
The important fact a bout the intellect is its spiritual-
ity, in defense of which St. Thomas offers three proofs; 
1) it can know incorporeal things; 2) it has the power of re-
flection; 3) its proper object is the universal idea. We will 
summarize these three proofs. 
First, the knowledge that men acquire through the exter-
\ 
nal and internal senses always 'has to do with the singular 
and concrete, as e~perience itself shows. 'This fact is the 
result of the inherent dependence of the sen.ses on physical 
organs for their proper functions; the sense of sight, for 
example, by means of its delicate organ, the eye, is adapted 
to receive and retain the external forms of individual colored 
objects. The intellect has an entirely different nature; it 
begins where the senses end their work. The,fundamental pro-
cess of the intellect is to abstract from the individuating 
25 Summa, I, 16, 1. 

The second power of the intellect is that of reflection, 
., 
which is an action outside the realm of a purely material sub-
stance. Reflection, which is a turning or folding back upon 
oneself, is impossible for a material being, because the same 
part of a being having parts outside of parts cannot touch the 
very same part. The intellect, however, can accomplish this 
feat; it ~an reflect upon itself, not.only part by part, but 
as a whole. st. Thomas writes: 
No body's action reflects on the 
agent: for it is proved ••• that no 
body is moved by itself except in 
respect of a part, so that, namely, 
one of its parts be mover and the 
other moved. Now the intellect by 
its action reflects on itself, for i~ 
it understands .itself not only as 
a part, but as a whole. 27 
In another place he says that tlit is impossible for any power 
emp~oying a bodily organ to reflect on its own act, since the 
instrument whereby it would know itself would fall midway be-
tween the power knowing and the instrument by which it knew 
in the first place. tl28 
Finally, the spirituality of t he intellect is inferred 
27 Loc. cit.; "Nullius corporis actio reflectitur super agen-
tem; oetensum est enim ••• quod nullum corpus a seipso movetur 
nisi ,secundum partem, ita scilicet quod una pars ejus sit mo-
vens, alia mota. Intellectus autem supra seipsum, non solum ~e­
cundum partem, sed secundum totum." 
28 St. Thomas Aquinas. In L1brum III Sententiarum, Dist. 23, 
Q. I, a. 2: 'tHoc autem nOnpotest esse ita quod al1t!4Ua potenti 
u1=-ens organo corporali-reflectatur super proprium actum, quia 
oportet quod 1nstrumentum quo cognosci se, eaderet medium int 
ipsam potent~am et instrumentumquo primo cognoscebat. tf 
from the universality and neoess1ty~6f the idea which it po-
., 
ssesses. The speoies or ideas of things understood become 
actually intelligible only through the fact that they are ab-
stracted from individual matter; and in so far as they are 
actually intelligible are they one with the intellect. There-
fore, by very nature the universal must be immaterial, and 
the idea must be universal; as a result the intelleot, which 
has the idea as its proper obJect, must be immaterial. 29 
In describing the mode in which the intellect acts as a 
spiritual faculty St. Thomas introduces t~ new terms: possible 
intellect (intellectus possibilis) and active intellect (in-
tellectus agens). The intellect is a passive potency, since 
. . 
it can possess universal forms and essences; it resembles a 
clean slate upon which the ideas are to be formed by the ac-
tive intellect. 30 As an active poteney the intellect through 
the spiritually effective force, the active intellect, il-
lumines the sensible phantasms, and by abstracting from all 
individual and sensitive detail it releases the intelligible 
universal species which in turn informs the possible intellect 
and brings it into act. 31 The sensible phantasms Offered by 
29 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 50: "Intellectus ••• non potest 
esse compositus ex materia et forma individuali; species enim 
rerum intellectarum fiunt intelligibiles actu per hoc quod a 
materia individuali abstrahuntur;secundum autem quod sunt in-
telligibiles actu, fiunt unum cum intellectu; unde et intellec-
tum oportet esse' absque materia ino.ividuali. fI 
30 Summa, I, 14, 2 ad 3. 
31 Meyer, 2E. cit., 187. 
4 
the imagination are not efficient causes of knowledge, but 
., 
rather the instrumental agents ln the process of knowing. St. 
Thomas is not one to deny Aristotle's "Nil in intellectu guod 
~ prius fuerit in sensu; for him the human intel1ect is 
bound to its corporeal sensitive existence and by its nature 
tends to the forms of material things. Yet as a sniritual 
faculty the intellect rises far above the sensible world, be-
cause its adequate object which is the nature or essence of 
things, is the product of a spiritual operation proceeding 
only from a spiritual faculty. 
The second faculty of the soul, called by St. Thomas the 
will or the intellectual appetite32 , supplements the first 
faculty; together they form'the essence of the soul, in which 
they are rooted as interdepending principles. Although these 
two faculties are specifically different, due to the differenc 
between their proper objects, they hav.e much in common, prin-
cipally the fact that they are immaterial potencies without 
corporeal organs. The spirituality of the will follows di-
rectly from that of the intellect. 
Now it is precisely because man is an intelligent crea-
ture that he enjoys the power of free-will. By means of his 
intellect he can set goals for himself, and pronose suitable 
methods for their attainment; by it he can determine what shal 
be the last practical judgment respecting his preference of 
32 Summa, I, 87, 4. 
one means over another. It is this practical judgment, in 
., 
fact, th~t gives the will reason to act at all, since the will 
waits for the presentation of an object sufficient to move the 
will to ac tion. ~ The cognitive faculty provides the evalua-
ting judgment and offers counsel as to whichcobject is to be 
preferred, while the appetitive faculty supplies the approval 
or disapproval. Thus, we can safely state that the root of 
'. 
freedom is in the reason as well as in the will; it is in the 
reason as in its cause and in the will as in its subject. 
And, as St. Thomas remarks, the will can turn freely to se-
veral different objects only because the reason has revealed 
the good in these objects. 33 
When a man looks about him in the world and sees myriads 
of other kinds of creatures fixedly determined to certain ways 
of action, he knows that as a free being he mus,t be very spe-
cial, one worthy of honor and full of dignity. He knows that 
he can perform a deed or not perform it, that he can do it in 
this way or in another, while these other creatures -- earth-
bound by nature -- have not 'Such powers. He will r,easonably 
conclude that he and all other men possess a power that is 
exe~t from the' determining eonditions of matter. This power 
.--------------
33 Ibid., I-II, 17, 1, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod rad-
ix libertatis est voluntas sieut subjeetum; sed s-iout eausa,' 
est ratio; ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri 
quia ratio pot est habere diversas, conoeptiones boni. Et ideo 
philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium, quod est liberum de 
ratione judieium, quasi ratio sit eausa libertatis." 
rr of willing gives evidence of a will-faculty. According to the 
~ ~ 
philosoPhical axiom, "action follows being," (actio sequitur 
esse) as a being is, so must it act. (In more familiar form, 
- -
this is a variant statement of the principl"e of causality: 
"The effect cannot transcend its cause,tt or ttWhatever becomes 
must have a proportionate cause.") Thus, we know that the im-
material effect of willing must proceed from the immaterial 
cause, the will. 
If someone argues that the will is determined to a common 
object to which it inclines naturally, namely the good in gen-
eral, we can agree with St. Thomas that this inclination is 
only another proof of the willIs spirituality. St. Thomas 
. 
distinguishes between the will considered as nature and as 
~; he states, ttSince ••• the will is an immaterial power like 
the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it natu-
rally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there cor-
responds some one general thing, which is the true •••• "34 
The power ~o will supplements tbe power to think; knowledge 
-- apprehension of Truth -- leads volition -- desire of Good-
ness -- to action. The will, like the intellect in man, is 
revealed as a ,piritual faculty of man's spiritual soul. 
Now that we~have briefly outlined st. Thomas' exposition 
34 Ibid., I-II, 10, 1, ad 3: nCum igitur voluntassit quae-
dam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet ei na-
turaliter aliquodunum commune, 8ilicat bonum, sicut etiam 
intellect'Ui aliquod unum commune, "scilicet verum." 
rr of the two powers, of the soul we can investigate the nature of 
~ 
the soul as such. First, we know that the soul is a spiritual 
something; this fact has been proVen in our review of the 
spirituality of the two powers of the soul. Just as the im-
~aterial operations of knowing and willing proceed from the 
immate~lal causes, intellect and will; so must an immaterial 
intellect and an immaterial will find sufficient cause for 
their existence as faculties of an immaterial soul. Defining 
soul as "the first principle of life," St. Thomas begins his 
"Treatise on Man" by proving that the soul is necessarily 
spiri tual: 
••• no body can be. the first prin-, 
c.;iple of life. For lt ls clear 
that to be a prlnciple Of life, . 
or to be a living thing, does not 
belong to a body as a body, since, 
lf that were the case, every body 
would be a living thing, or a prin-
ciple of life. Therefore a body 
is competent to be a living thing, 
or even a. prlnciple of 11fe, as 
such a body_ Now that it is ac-
tually such a body it owes to S)'me 
principle which is called its act. 
Therefore, the SOul, which is the 
flrst prlnciple ofllfe, is not a 
body, but the act of a body; just 
as heat, which is the principle of 
calefactlon, is not a body but an 
act of a body. 35 
35 Ibid., I, 75, I: ." ••• aliquod corpus non potest esse primum 
principium vitae. Manifestum' est enim quod esse principlum 
vitae, vel vlvens non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus; 
alloquin omnecorpus ,eset vlvens aut principium vitae. Con-
venlt igltur alicul corpori quod sit vlvens, vel etiam prln-
cipium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est 
actutale habet hoc ab allquo principio, quod dicituractus 
ejus. Anima igitur quae est primum princlpium vitae, non est 
corpus, sed corporis actus; sicut calor, qui est pripciplum 
calefaotionis non est cor s sed uldam cor orls actus." 
'1' 
The second question St. Thomas aalte about the soul is 
.. 
whether it is subSistent, that is, does it have a nature all 
its own, or does it depend entirely upon the body for its be-
ing as such. His answer is: 
I 
Therefore the intellectual principle, 
which we call the mind of the intel-
lect, has essentially an operation 
in which the body does not share. 
Now only that which subsists in it-
self can have an operation in itself. 
For nothing ~an operate but what is 
actual, and so a thing operates ac~ 
cording as it is.'36 
Gilson appeals to the doctrine of matter and form to prove, that 
the soul has subsistence. He argues: 
••• although the man alone fully de-
serves the name of substance, he 
nevertheless owes all his substan-
tiality to that of the soul. For 
the human soul is act, and is there-
fore a thing for itself and a sub-
stancejthe body, on the contrary, 
although without it the soul cannot 
develop the fullness of its actuality, 
has neither actuality nor subsistence, 
save those received from its. form, 
that is to say from the soul,,_37 
The sO'I.J.l of man does not need the body in the, same way that 
the body needs the soul. Since the soul is the informing prin 
ciple, the'body without this principle remains non-existent; 
the soul, on the other hand, remains subsistent whether the 
36 Ibid., I, 75, 2:' "Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, 
quod d1citur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, 
cui non commu'iiICit corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, 
nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis 
in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur quo est." 
37 Q2. cit., 187 
51 
body stays united to it or not. And this brings us to the 
~ 
last and perhaps the most important consideration concerning 
the soul -- i~s immortality. 
What has been already said about the spirituality and 
substantiality of the soul offers much more than an introduc-
tion to the proofs of the soul's incorruptibility. st. Thom~s 
presupposes that the soul is spiritual and subsistent, when 
he begins his arguments for its incorruptibility. He claims 
that a thing may be corrupted in one of two ways: in itself 
and accidentally. Taking for granted that tae human soul has 
being in-itself, it follows that it cannot be accidentally 
generated or corrupted, that is, by the generation or corrup-
tion of something, else, since generation and corruption be-
long to a thing in the same way that being belongs to it. 
Things which do not subsist, such as accidents and mere ma-
terial forms, acquire being or lose it through the generation 
or corruption of composites. Seeondly, whatever is subsis-
tent, such as the human soul, cann<;>t be corrupted in::ltself, 
because being belongs to a form, such as the human soul, Bl 
virtue of itself and is therefore inseparable from it. Matter 
acquires actual being according as it acquires form; it loses 
being aooording as it loses form. But form cannot be separa-
ted from itself, and- thus it is impOss~ble for a subsistent 
form to cease to exist. 38 In a word, the dissolution of 
---------,...----
38 Summa, I, 75,6. 
, 
man I s body (matter), which owes its being to man's soul (form), 
41 
can in no way affect the being of the soul-itself, for being 
I 
~aturally (by virtue of itself) belongs to the soul, and can-
not be separated from it. 
A difficulty that immediately suggests itself, and one 
that has important consequences in our study of the nature of 
the human soul, is presented by st. Thomas thus: "Whether the 
separated soul can understand anything?" 
-, 
To solve this difficulty we must 
consider that nothing act.s except 
so far as it is actual, and there-
fore the mode of action in every 
agent follows from the mode of its 
being. Now the soul has one mode 
of being when in the body, and ~n-
. other when apart from it, though 
its nature remains the same. 39 
St. Thomas continues by telling just how the mode o"f'thinking 
in a soul joined with a body differs from that of a "separated 
soul." In the first existence the soul necessarily depends 
on corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; in the 
second existence it turns to pure intelligibles, as is proper 
to sep~rate substances. Althougn knowledge through pure in-
telligibles is in itself a nobler method of understanding, 
still it is not natural to intellects joined to bodies, else 
39 Ibid., I, 89,1: "Et ideo ad hanc difficultatemtollendam 
considerandum est quod cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est 
actu, modus operandi uniuscujusqu~ rei se.qui tur modurn essendi 
ipsius. Rabet autem anima alium modum essendi, cum unitur 
corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen 
eadem animae.natura." 
men would have been created without corporeal sense organs and 
.. 
without the power of properly knowing sensible things from 
the things themselves. Therefore, it is for the soul's good 
that it-is united to a body, and that it understands by turTl1T1e 
to the phantasms; yet it is possible for it to exist apart 
from the body and also to understand in another way. 
Now this again presents a problem. If the soul is inde-
pendent of the body even in thought process, It would seem 
that it is so sufficient in itself that its union with the 
body is no more than accidental. Or we might be led to con-
clude that man is ·a third substance compounded of two other 
substances body and soul. Now St. Thomas ineiststhat the 
union of body and soul is a substantial union: man is a com-
plex substance which owes its substantiality to only one of 
its constitutive principles, that is, to the soul; man is 
neither body, which subsists only by the soul, nor soul, which 
would remain, according to his nature, destitute without the 
body; man is the substantial unity of soul, which substant~a­
lizes the body, and of body, in'which the soul subsists. 40 
Thus when someone says "1 know," he does not mean that his 
body knows, nor that his soul know.s, nor that his soul knows 
by means of his body, but that a concrete being "I," taken in 
its unity, performs an act of knowing. The soul of man cannot 
develop its activity without. the cooperation of sensorial 
40 Ibid., I, 75, 4; 76, 5; 89, 1. 
organs, and in prder to obtain this cooperation it must actua-
# 
lize the body, which would not be without the soul; yet the 
soul is not itself save in a body. The nature of the soul is 
such, however, that even though the body corrupts, the soul 
continues in being, how different so-ever the mode may be. 
To return to our starting point concerning the definition 
, 
of "person," is to discover that "human person tl is but a syn-
onym for "man." Man, we have seen, is a substantial unity of 
matter and form, but bec~use his form is a spiritual, sub-
sistant, incorruptible principle, it should be emphasized. 
The matter, on the other hand, is not to be despised; it does 
have a dignity of its own. The important point, however, is 
that the matter's worthiness is designed for the perfection 
of the form, and that man's dignity comes not from the matter 
but from the spirituality, substantiality, and incorruptibil-
ity of the form. It is this dignity that identifies man with 
his personality. From our discussion of individuating notes 
we must recall that although matter is the principle of indi-
viduation, once individuated it is the form that is indivi-
dual, because "it is the subsistence of this individual form 
which, investing matter with its own proper existence, per-
mits the individual to subsist!~l And since the form of man 
is his soul, we begin to see how really important this soul 
must be. Men are individuals, but more, they are human 
41 G11son,.Q.E. c1 t., 200-201.. 
persons; the natures of their souls make them such. 
# Having reviewed the nature of man, the human person, with 
his body-soul unity, we can now investigate his origin as a 
human person. First we must observe with the Angelic Doctor42 
that by his nature man stands midway between corruptible and 
incorruptible creatures, since his soul is naturally incorrup-
tible and his body is naturally corruptible. "Man," claims 
st. Thomas, "in a certain sense contains all things •••• his 
reas on, whic h makes him 1 ike to the angel s (-incorrupt i bl e) ; 
his sensitive .powers, whereby he is like the animals; his 
natural powers, which liken him to the plants; and the body 
itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things. ,t43 It thus 
seems that all matter aims at the ultimate form, the form of 
man: prime matter in potency to the forms' of the elements, 
they in potency to the forms of the mixed bodies, they in po-
. 
tency to the vegetative soul, it in pmtency to the sensitive 
soul, and it in potency to the intel~-ctual soul. And beyond 
this-the soul is the connecting link with the purely spiritual 
intell igences . 
42 Summa, I, 98,1: "Est ergo considerandum quod homo secundum 
suam naturam est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter crea-
turascorruptibiles et incorruptibiles; nam anima ejus- est na-
turaliter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corrupti-
bile. " 
43 Ibid., I, 96,2: " ••• in homine quodammodo sunt emnia •••• Est 
autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secun-
dum quam convenit cum angelisj vires sensitivas, secundum quas 
convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales secundum quas conven-
it cum plantisj et ipsum corpus, secundum quod conventt cum 
rebus inanimatis." 
To understand fully the soul's dignity we must look to 
. ., 
its ultimate source of being, that is, to its creation. 
, ' 
The creation of man suggests the fact that he is a con-
tingent being,which in turn argues for tte existence of one 
principle of being from which all contingent things, in what-
ever way existing, have their being; this principle must be 
"the uncaused cause, fI the first and the ultimate reason for 
being, the Creator from whom all creation 'proceeds:~ 44 Thus we 
must understand God if we would truly know the meaning of 
creation. Since, according to st. Thomas, creation is the 
production of something from nothing (the "from" indicating a 
negation and expressing an order of things) there must be one 
-
absolutely Neeessarj!' and Pure Being, who can of Htmself make 
something out of nothing, and who alone will be the origin of 
being. 
Since all contingent 'beings are made according to their 
different natures, the nature of man's soul will determine 
its mode of creation. Because the rational soul is a spiri-
tual, subsistent form, it cannot be made of pre-existing mat-
ter (whether Gorporeal, which would render it a corporeal be-
ing, or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of 
one spiritual subs,tance into another). Nor can it be made 
through the action or any created pure spirit, since it would 
presuppose something to its act and Qe capable of acting only 
44 Ib id., I, 65, I • 
rr~' ___________ rr ~ 
( 
by producing a change in matter, of which the soul is no 
~ 
part. 45 Therefore, the rational soul must be created imme-
diately by a uncreated Pure Spirit, and this is God. Because .. 
the soul is naturally the informing principle of man's body, 
it cannot be created by itself as though ~t were a complete 
species, but must be created in the body, which is the proper 
potentiality ~ which the soul is the proper act. 46 
The nature of the body will also affect its creation. Be 
sides the fact that the materiality of the body demands that 
it come from pre-existing matter, whether it be the EHime of 
the earth or the semen-ovum union, there must be an apt dis-
position in a body, which depends upon a soul for its substan-
tiality. Since the proximate end of the human body is the 
rational soul, and its operations, in the same way that mat-
ter is fbr the form, God fashioned the body in the disposition 
that was best to serve the soul and its. operation of thinking 
and willing. "If defect exists in the human body," says st. 
Thomas, "it is well to observe that such defect arises, as a 
necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required 
in the body in order to make it suitably proportioned to the 
45 Ibid., I, 90, 2, ad 3. 
46 Ibid., I, 90, 4 sed contra: "'actus proprius fit in po-
tentra-propria.' Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis 
anima producaaest in corpore.'! ad 1: "Sed quia naturaliter 
est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit cre-
ari in corpore." 
rr~------~----~ 
j 
soul and its operations. 1147 As an example of the body's sub-
iii 
servience to the good of the soul, he tells how man has an 
erect stature, so that his superior part, his head, is turned 
towards the heavens, and his inferior part is turned towards 
the earth; other animals have their heads turned down so that 
they can more easily seek food and procure a livelihood, while 
man is able to survey the heavenly and earthly things around 
him and so gather intelligible truth from them and have free-
dom in using his spiritual faculties. 48 
We can truly say that man's rational nature is given even 
greater dignity by reason of the SOUl's being created as it 
is, and by reason of the body's being created for the soul. 
Now why is this true? From'what does this greater dignity 
(if it may be called greate~) come? St. Thomas gives the 
answer by asking another question: "Whether the image of God 
is in m~?" He wants to know .if something of the Creator mani 
fests itself in the creature. To get at the full meaning of 
this problem we must distinguish the kinds of Creator-manifes-
tations. 
Since all things look to too. Universal First Cause as the 
ul timate source of both their being and their operations, all' 
47 Ibid., I, 91,3: "Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione hu 
mani-coTporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis de-
fectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae ad ea quaerequiruntur 
in corpore, ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad 
animae operationes." 
48 Loc. cit., ad 3. 
must necessarily resemble the Creator in some respect; for 
., 
every effect in some way or other must represent its cause. 
Some effects represent only the causality of their cause, but 
not its form; their representation is referred to as a trace, 
for a trace indicates ,that something or someone has passed by, 
without disclosing the passer-by's identity. Other effects 
represent their cause by a likeness of form; this is called 
representation of image. Now all ~hings resemble God in that 
they have being; some of them in that they have life; others 
in that they have rationality. Only reason-endowed creatures, 
such as man, approach near enough to the Being of their First 
Cause to merit the title, image of God,49 because only they 
bear a specific resemblance to God through their spiritual 
onerations of knowing and willing. 50 
The conclusions brought forward 'Oy man's likeness to his 
Creator suggest themselves: 1) the image of God is not found 
in irrational creatures, because they do not manifest a spe-
cific likeness to God;51 2) pure spirits are more like to God 
than are men, because the intellects of pure spirits are more 
49' The important requisite for a true image is that it must 
proceed from another like to it in species, or at least in 
specific sign. 'Ibid., 1,35,1. 
50 Lest man take too much dignity for himself, st. Thomas 
warns us that it is more correct to say that man is,Uto the 
image of God," than to call him simply "image of God,~' al-, 
though if correctly understood we may call the human person an 
image of God. Ibid., 1,93,1, ad 2. 
51 Ibid., I,93~ 
perfect;52 3) the image of God 1s found in every man because 
# 
of his. creation as a rational animalj53 4) the image of God is 
found in the acts of the soul, because these acts are specifi-
cally like (no matter how i~perfectly) those of God, and the 
more perfectly men use their faculties of intellect and will, 
the more perfectly will they liken themselves to Him, who is 
AII-Perfect.54 Perhaps we understand now what St. Thomas 
meant when he wrote, "Person signifies what is most perfect in 
all nature,"55 and what Gilson meant by the words, "We are 
persons because we are the work of a Person •••• To be a person 
is to participate in one of the highest excellences of the 
divine being."56 
52 Ibid., 1,93,3. 
53 Ibid., 1,93,4. 
54 IbId., 1,93,7. 
55 Ibid., 1,29,3: " ••• persona significat id quod est perfec-
tissimum in tota natura." 
56 QE. cit., 205 • 
. ' lTwo corollary thoughts proc·eeding from the fact of man 
created-like-to-God suggest themselves; one in the form of a 
grace from God, the other in the form of an obligation upon 
man. The first thought is that of God's providence, which 
comes directly from the heart of creation. It would be in-
credible for God to present certain creatures with rational 
faculties specifically like His own, and then to neglect these 
creatures for the rest of their immortal existence. If it is 
reasonable to expect God to care for incorruptible creatures 
that bear merely traces of His specific nature, how much more 
will He protect and care for those who are intimately bound to 
Him by their very personalities. The second thought is that of 
man's subordinate attitude towards his Creator, and of his ob-
liga~ion of prayer to Him. Since prayer is an act of the rea-
son, it is proper to a rational creature; since it is an act 
intended only for the reverence and honor of God through love 
of Him, it above all acts is the most perfect. 
The final point that enters into our analysis of the dig-
., 
nity of the human person comes naturally from an understanding 
of the nature and origin of man. Now we wish to deal with 
his destiny. Why does man exist? Why does he ex.ist as he is? 
And how does he achieve the purpose of his particular exis-
tence? 
The first decision that even the most cursory student of 
Scholastic philosophy would make in regard to this philosophy 
is that it is theocentric. Almost no problem in metaphYSics, 
psychology, or e.thics can be raised without relating it to 
God; in a true philosophy He must always remain the beginning, 
the center, the end; for He alone is Being, the source of be+ 
· ing, and. the fund to which the participants of Being must re-
turn. All life is, in a sense, a circle from God, back to 
God. Now in discussing the why of man, who, as we have seen, 
stands midway between purely rational and purely irrational 
beings, we must keep in mind the divine attributes'of God, who 
is not determined by His nature to depend upon anything out-
side Himself. We are not seeking a cause of the oreative act 
of God whereby men came to be, for the oreative act is God Him 
self; He has no cause, He Himself is cause. To seek a cause 
for God's own Will would imply an existence prior to Him or 
would demand a distinction of powers or attributes in God, who 
is Himself perfect One-ness. But to seek the end or purpose 
of God's acts is another question. If we denied that the Will 
of God had an end for its acts, then we would be subjecting 
41 
God to blind necessity or irrational contingency, either of 
which would certainly limit the perfection of God. What we 
can reasonably say, however, is that it would be contradictory 
for God in creatiTIg to have any other end than Himself; the 
only- possible end.of the divine Will is the Divine Being, and 
since this Being is identical with the Good, we may say that 
the only possible end for God is His own perfection. All these 
pre-notes are understood by St. Thomas when he quotes St~ Au-
gustine's phrase, "Because God is good, we exist. tl5' 
Generally speaking, an end is that towards which the move-
ment of an agent tends; if there were no purpose in view, the 
agent would not act; when the purpose is attained he ceases 
acting. Again we may state that every agent by his action 
tends to ~me definite good thing; this statement is ~oven 
from the fact that all action and movement is direC:f,ed in 
some way to being, either for the preservation or acquisition 
of being; now being is a good; thus all action and movement is 
directed to good, which may be def ined as Uthe ob ject. of every 
appetite.,t~ Pressing this same argument to its ultimate 
limits we immediately see that the ultimate end of all created 
things must be the good that is ultimate and supreme. Now 
there is but one s preme and ultimate good, God. Thus we not 
5? Summa, I, 19, 4, ad 3: " ••• quia Deus ·bonus est, sumus." 
58 Contra Gentiles, III, 3. 

Glory, in general, is a kind of manifestation of perfec-
4i 
tion; according to st. Ambrose it is "clear knowledge with 
praise" (clara ~ laude notitia). We know that it·results 
from two acts, one of the intellect, and the other of the will; 
therefore, on11 a rational creature can glorify anything. In 
relation to God we note two kinds of possible glory: intrinsic 
whereby God perfectly knows Himself and praises Himself, ex-
trinsic whereby rational creatures know and praise their God 
in as perfect a manner as they are capable of doing. From 
what we have alreadysaicl about God, who is the source and 
object of all being, it becomes apparent that human persons 
will have certain obligations towards ,Him, who gave then per-
sonality; they will need to glorify God explicit~y by their 
acts of knowledge and love of Him, and implicitly by turning 
their intellects only to truth and their wills only to what 
is good. In a word, men will have the obligation of always 
being reasonable, which is another way of describing a human 
person. 
Beatitude, the other aspect of man's final end, can be 
defined as "the perfect good that satisfies the appetite com-
pletely.,,6D Since we know that man necessarily and always 
seeks a good end for all his actions and movements, ultimately 
he will have to seek the ultimate good end. Now if through 
61> Summa, I-II, 2,8: It ••• bonum perfectum quod totaliter 
quletat appetitum." 
the process of elimination we were to apply the various nendsn 
41 
men might take as ultimate as st. Thomas has done in the 
second book of his Summa, or as St. Augustine does in his Con-
fessions, and Francis Thompson. in tiThe Hound of Heaven" -- we 
"-
will discover that only He, who is the First Cause, the Pure 
Act, the All-Being, is Himself the Person, with whom these 
lesser persons seek to identify themselves by means of their 
person-powers given to them by God. 
In summary, the metaphysical argument of the Scholastics 
puts the spot-light on the essence of man; it tells us that 
he is more than'an individual, that he is a human person, ~ 
unity of body and soul, whose principal operations are those 
. 
of knowing and wil=!-ingj it tells us that the body and soul 
come from God, the body mediately, the soul immediately and 
made to the image of God Himself, and that the soul must re-
turn to its Creator for an immortal existence. This basic 
concept of man is not entirely verifiable in sense-experience, 
although it does have criteria ~nd proofs staunchly un-
assailable 'ones -- which reveal to the honest student of man 
not merely a half-picture but a complete description of man 
~ he ~: a human person a creature of dignity. The ScholaS-
tic. admits the existence of man's body and its necessity for 
the fulfillment of a truly human life; he also sees dignity 
in that same body, but a dignity of parts subordinated to the 
well-being of the whole, of delicate members caring for the 
F ! nourishment of the entire structure and for the propagation of 
# 
other bodies like to it; yet he goes beyond the body's merely 
physical existence and there finds a reason for that existence. 
The Scholastic follows the reliable dictates of his reason 
when he says that the iesser must lead to the greater, the 
crasser to the nobler; he sees in man a higher life than that 
of vegetation and sensation, and he thinks that it -- the in-
tellectual life -- must be the master, while the less noble 
must serve. He sees in this intellectual life, called "soul", 
an image that gives it greater value than the 'whole physical 
universe. And he says this is man. 
We began our thesis by writing of a "basic foundation," 
and we have found it in the dignity of the human person •. What 
this concept of man has to do with the relations of men in 
society becomes immediately evident. Either this is man or 
it is not man. There ar~ no half-men, half-brutes -- although 
some men may seem to have cast off their rational natures for 
the irrationality of purely animal existence. The accidental 
physical characteristics of individual men in no way affect 
their essences as rational beings. To ask "How big is man?" 
or ttWbat color is man?tt is to show ignorance about the most 
fundamental concept of reality. To emphasize any purely phy-
sical characteristic of a man is to insult the essential dig-
nity of that man and to ~warf one's own nature. Mr. Louis 
Achille writes: 
In defining himself by the traits 
of his ethnic group a man travesties # 
the true dignity of his own human 
personality; ignoring his essence, 
he chooses to exist in its accidents, 
and attempts to degrade -- if it 
were in his power -- his own person 
to the rank of nonhuman creature.6t 
The man who emphasizes his· body traits to the detriment of his 
soul's essence is like the idiotic ruler that amuses himself 
with his crown' and his regal robe, and thinks nothing of his 
kingship.61 
Now it is our contention that so long as the true under-
standing of the nature, origin, and destiny of man -- as ex-
pressed in the metaphysics of Scbolastic philosophy -- is ne-
glected, so long as the material is placed over the spiritual, 
the soul made servant to the body, then mankInd, no matter how 
intricate or highly specialized his civilization may be, will 
despair of itself and endanger its chances of ever attaining 
the peace and happiness which it madly craves and which it has 
the power to enJoy not only during the few moments on this 
earth but forever. 
6'1 Louis T. Achille, "What Color, Man?" Democracy Should It 




THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: ETHICAL 
In studying man's personality we find that his rational 
nature imposes upon him certain obligations towards God, him-
self, and other men, and confers upon him corresponding abso-
lute rights which assure his fulfilling these obligations. It 
is this problem of obligations and rights that will determine 
to a greater or less extent the success of human relationships. 
This is the snecial problem for those men who have tried to 
degrade the soul-part of certain other men by despising some 
accidental characteristic, such as color of skin, which makes 
up the body-part of them. Those who degrade their fellow 
creature's personality are under definite obligations which 
they have forgotten. They who are the objects of this deg-
radation have definite rights that must be protected, if not 
by themselves then by other members of human society. 
The Scholastic q.octrine of human rights is baseq.. on the 
metaphysical foundation of man's essential dignity as a human 
person. Mants dignity is the necessary ttreason-for-beingtf of 
man's natural rights. (In the most ultimate sense only God, 
the First-Cause, can be the primary cause of human rights; in 




proximate foundation, but a true foundation nonetheless.)l 
., 
Because man has an intellect, which gives him the power to 
exercise control over them, he must use these powers for the 
development of his personality. Man knows only one dependence, 
that of his being with relation to the Creator, but this de-
pendence, far from alienating him confirms him in his being, 
since it binds him to that which communicates to him intelli-
genoe and will.2 For this reason his person may be called 
absolute (ab-solutus, detached from other things), and he 
may be said to be an end in himself. Within himself he has 
the faculties.to develop himself; outside himself he has the 
obligation to direct these faculties to the proximate' goal, 
his o~n person, and to the ultimate goal, God. 
In order for manto attain the goals for which he natur-
ally exists, he needs certain safeguards that will assure 
him of 'freedom in this attainment. These safeguards we call 
natural rights or "inviolable mora.l claims to personal goods 
••• whioh a man acquires with, his nature ••• designed as means 
for attaining his natural end."3 These rights are not derived 
from any positive authority, but prooeed immediately from 
1 Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P., Summa Theologiae Moralis, 
2nd edition. Descless de Brower and C., Paris, Vol. II, uDe 
Virtutibus Moralibus," 1935, 159. 
2 Joseph T. Delos, O.P., "The Rights of the Human Person 
vis-a-vis of the State and the Race," Race: Nation: Person,48. 
3 Francis J. Gilligan, ~ Morality of the Color Line. The 
Catholic Univermty of America Press, Washington, I928, 39. 
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man's rational nature and are directed immediately to the 
ttl 
well-being of the human person possessing that nature; that 
is, they are natural to man and for man; they may be defined 
as "extensions of personality.tt4 
Since, therefore, man's natural rights are intimately 
concerned with the obligations imposed by the nature, origin 
and destiny of his very being, they are so necessary and so 
sacred for him that all men are mor&ly restrained from in-
terfering with them or ignoring them. In order to protect 
these rights all men are obliged to exercise a special moral 
virtue, called justice. This virtue is defined by st. 'Thomas 
as ~the perpetual and constant will to give everyone his 
due. u5 With Aristotle, St. 'Thomas distinguishes three kinds 
of justic'e: a particular justice, divided into 1) commutative 
and 2) distributive; and 3) a general justice, called legal 
or social. As Father Meyer points out, this distinction 
"corresponds to the essential struc-
ture of the community which manifests 
a three-fold relationship: thta rela-
tion of the members among themselves, 
the relation of the whole to the mem-
bers, and the relation of the members 
to the whole."6 
The first relationship brings with it the moral obligation of 
one person's giving to another person his due, thus preserving 
an absolute equality between the thing owed (debitum) and the 
4 William J. Kerby. The Social Mission of Charity. The Cath-
olic University of America Press, 'aillngton, rep. 1944, 55. 
5 Summa, II-II,58,l: " ••• perpetua et constans voluntasius 
suum unlquique tribuens." 
r 
thing given:' (datum). The second imposes an obI igation on the 
~ 
governors of a community to distribute among the members an 
equal proportion of burdens and rewards according to the needs 
and receptive cauacities of the members. The last relation-
ship presents the virtue of social justice, by which the mem-
bers of a community are obliged to observe and promote laws 
for the common welfare. 7 
Just as there is a special moral virtue that protects 
men's natural rights, so is there a special vice opposed to 
that virtue. St. Thomas says, ft ••• as the object of justice 
in external things is something equal, so the object of in-
justice is something unequal, that is, a person gets more or 
less than he deserves. ft8 It is unjust to deny a man his na-
tural rights or to hinder without a reasonable cause his free 
use of them. We say "without a reasonable cause," because, 
although man's natural rights are absolute in existence, they 
are not absolute in extent; they are subject to limitations 
that will depend on the will of only the person in whom they 
inhere. For example, since a man has a right to live, not 
7 Summa, II. 58.5,7,8: 61.1,2; 62.1. (According to st. Thomas 
restitution is demanded only for a violation of commutative 
justice, because there must be perfect equality between the 
thing owed and the thing given, i.e., the thing possessable 
and possessed by two distinct individuals. In distributive 
and social justice the man having .the right is himself a part 
of the whole, and cannot owe anything to himself nor make. re-
stitution to himself.) 
8 Ibid., II-II,59,2: n ••• sicut objectum justitiae est aliquid 
aequale in rebus exterioribus, ita etiam objectum injustitiae 
est aliquid inaequale, prout scilicet alicui attribuitur plus 
vel mimls uam sibi competat. tt 
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even the State in order to preserve its own existence may di-
~. 
rectly and deliberately put an innocent man to death. The 
natural right to life belongs in an absolute way to all men, 
and in itself it is prior to any claim the State may have in 
opposition to it. Man as a human person is autonomous in re-
lation to the State, which has meaning only in relation to 
the welfare of its members. W~en, however, an individual 
member gravely and willingly offends against the just law of 
the State, he may be justly deprived of freedom to life or 
even exeouted by the State. But the right to life is limited 
only by the free-will action of the person possessing the 
right. 9 
Now it is a speoial kind of injustice to deny that this 
or that man has any natural rights at all, beoause natural 
rights are substantially equal in all men 1 although their ex-
tension will depend upon the various oapacities and needs of 
the persons concerned. The right to a higher education, for 
example, will include more opportunities for self-improvement 
in the cases of those who have greater capacities for learning 
But for all men the natural right will embrace a oertain mini-
mum of eduoation that is necessary for preserving and develop-
ing men acoording to the reasonable needs of their personal-
ities. Because all men are equal in the nature, origin, and 
9 This free-will aotion may be more or less deliberate on the 
part of the actor; for example, when a member of a State at 
war dons a uniform of his country, he thereby becomes a mili-
tary target. 
destiny of their !ruman persons, their ri.ghts, which are tl ex-
~ 
tensi.ons of personality," will be equal in kind, number, and 
sacredness. To deny that a particular man or group of men 1· 
have natural rights is to deny that they are men. A blow aim-
ed at a person's rights is a blow aimed at the essence of 
that person. Without rights men cannot fulfill the ob1iga-
tions imposed upon them as human persons; without rights they 
cannot be at all. 
A second consequence of any form of injustice is that 
the natural rights of all men suffer when the rights of one 
man or one group of men are attacked. The reason for this is 
that "such an attack can be justified only by setting aside 
the ethical doctrine as to the objectivity and primacy of 
all and every form of human rights ~ rights which alone gives 
validity to any individual c1aim. fl10 An attempt to destroy, 
if it were possible, the essential equality existing between 
all men results in a complete destruction of all men's in-
trinsic worthiness ·and consequently all natural rights. 
It is but a short step from general ethical principles 
to the particular question at hand. Since natural rights 
belong to all men because they are men, these rights must 
flow from the essential constituents of men's persons and not 
from their accidental characteristics of soul or body. 
10 John La Farge, The Race iuestion and the Negro. Longmans, 
Green, and Co., New York, 19 4, 80. 
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In order to analyze more clearly the ethical argument 
., 
we will specify those human rights that all men must equally 
have to fulfill the reasonable demands of their personalities. 
Following the Jeffersonian division we will group these rights 
under the headings: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness. The most nerfectly absolute natural right man has is 
that of possessing the means necessary for the attainment of 
his ultimate end; all other rights must remain subordinate 
to this one; all other rigbts,'j;n"-a-sense, will be the means 
'nan needs. We call these riehts inal ienable because they 
nroceed from the intrinsic nature of an absolute being, al-
though contingent in relation to God, and because they direct 
their possessor to an ul tima.te goal of self-perfection through 
the participation of his being in the Divine Being. 
The first of man's inalienable rights (subordinate to 
the one perfectly absolute right) is that of existence, pre-
supposing the creative act, and of obtaining the means that 
are necessary for the sustenance of his existence. So ne-
cessary, indeed, is the right to exist that a man in extreme 
need may take another man's property to satisfy his need. 
The right to life is prior to the.right to possess property; 
the right of the first man supersedes that of the second. St. 
Thomas claims that a m~n in such need may take what is ne-
cessary, whether he does so covertly or in the open, because 
things that are s~perabundant for some men are by natural 
right the necessary means of sustaining the poor. 14 Conse-
., 
quent upon the first inalienable right are those to property, 
to work, and to receiving a wage adequate to care for oneself 
and family according to a standard befitting the dignity of 
human persons. 
The right to pronerty is part of the general right a 
man has to possess the goods of the earth for satisfying the 
reasonable need of his person. Ordinarily men need personal 
property in order to feed and clothe themselves, to raise and 
protect their family, and to safeguard their other rights, 
such as that to freedom and pursuit of happiness. By their 
physical make-up and their spiritual faculties of intellect 
and will they have the powers by which they can reasonably 
use external goods to satisfy 'their needs. Three further 
reasons for the right to property are suggested by st. Thomas: 
1) things owned in common are usually neglected by the ma-
jority, who lack interest in the things not imtimately con-
nected with themselves; 2) ordinarily human affairs are well 
directed for the welfare of both individuals and the common 
good, if the care of the good is left to individual persons; 
3) a more perfect community is preserved wh~n each man rests 
14 Summa, II-II, 66,7_ 
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content with what he has as his own. 15 
iii 
.Man's right to work in order to receive a wage adequate 
to care for himself and his family in a manner befitting the 
dignity of himself and his family is necessary for the pre-
servation and development of his person. Without this right 
his right to life would be meaningless, since this right is 
the means that assures him of his right to life and his right 
to attain his destiny. Without a certain amount of material 
possessions man's needs cannot be satisfied. Since God made 
the earth for all men, and since men usually must get their 
livelihood from the earth by labor, all men in general have 
equal rights over the material goods of the earth. But in 
specific cases men's rights differ, depending first on their 
needs and secondly on their capacities. A man with a family 
of ten, for example, will have a greater need for materi~l 
goods, and therefore a greater right to them than the man 
with only a wife to support. It is chiefly the duty of the 
State to see that an "equal" (according to needs) distribution 
of goods be preserved among its members. After the needs of 
men are taken care of ,then men's rights to the world's goods 
will depend on their natural capacities to receive them. The 
15 St. Thomas further states (Ibid. 11-11,66,2.) that the 
urg'e to strive fer a lasting poSS'e'Bsion of external things 
corresponds directly to a man's natural urge to care for his 
family, as well as to his human characteristic of helping . 
others. (Ibid.,II-II,32, 5 ad 3) Property should be private 
with respect to the power of acquisition and disposal but 
common as regards its use. Ibid., 11-11,118,1; 66, 2, ad 2. 
man with a stronger back or with more skilled hands or with 
~ 
a keener mind will have a greater right than his weaker or 
slower or duller brother. But if we consider the actual 
economic order as it exists in the United States, where a 
) 
part of the people possess most of the wealth, we must insist 
that the laborers who perform reasonable amounts of useful 
work have rights - equal to those of the owners of the earth -
to a decent livelihood not only for themselves but for their 
families as well. 16 Although it isjust for men to make free 
contracts with their masters who Itbuy" their labor, still the 
masters must remember that man's labor is personal and ne-
cessary for him and must therefore be regarded as-retaining 
the substance of a natural right, which is always permanent 
and inviolable. 17 
Again we have seen that man's rights ultimately depend 
on his intrinsic worthiness as a human person with consequent 
obligations to fulfill the needs of his personality. As soon 
as we admit man's dignity, we are naturally led to the ad-
mission of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to 
life, to own property, and to work for a living wage. Since 
these rights are based on the foundation of man's essence, 
16 John A. Ryan, "A Living Wage by Law," Readings in Ethics, 
edited by J. F. Leibell. Loyola University Press, Chicago, 
1926, 691-692. 
17 Pope Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum, fI Social Wellsprings, Vol. I, 
edited by Joseph Huss1ein, S.J., Bruce Publishing Co., Mil-
waukee, 1943, 193. 
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they must be regarded as inherent possessions that cannot be 
.. 
taken away from him without disturbing the very order of 
nature. 
The second specific right that all men have is the right 
to liberty, which may be personal or social. 
The most basic aspect of man's right to oersoanl liberty 
comes from the fact that he is directed and tends by the na-
ture of his being to a supernatural end. He has the obliga-
tion and therefore the right to worship God and to strive 
for his eternal destiny in God. Upon this rjght depends the 
ultimate satisfaction and perfection of man's human person-
ality. Religion, considered as a moral virtue, that gives 
God the honor He deserves, surpasses all other moral virtues 
because it alone is ordained directly and immediately to God 
as to its end. 18 If we ask whether man is free to determine 
how he shall practice religion, we must reply that objectively 
he has freedom to practice only the true religion, but that 
subjectively he must follow the dictates of his conscience. 19 
18 Summa, II-II, 81,5-6. 
19 St Thomas was very strict towards those who, once knowing 
Truth, leave it. Ibid., 11-11,11, 3; 10, 8, 11, 12. On the 
other hand, he forcefully protects the freedom of conscience 
of non-believers. Ibid., I-II, 19,5. For Catholics who are 
commanded by ecclesiastical authority to perform acts that 
violate the moral law or are opposed to their own mor~n con-
victions, St. Thomas claims that they must die under the sen-
tence of excommunication rather than disobey "the truth of 
life, It which may never be sacrificed. Ibid., II-II, 104, 
1, ad 1; 5. ----
The second aspect of personal liberty is that of the 
.. 
right to self-development, which includes the development of 
the whole man, his physical, intellectual, and moral traits. 
Since man has an inherent duty to develop his faculties of 
mind and will (first according to their needs and t he needs 
of his whole person; secondly according to their capacities 
to receive development), he must enjoy the means necessary 
for that development; these means are secured only by a cor-
responding right. 
A third personal right is that of marriage and family 
life. Not every man has the obligation towards which this 
right of marriage and family life looks. We may distinguish 
between a purely personal right which pertains to the person 
as an individual and a specific right which belongs to the 
whole species as benefitting the species as such. The for-
mer right has a corresponding unconditional obligation, but 
the specific right is not accompanied by this obligation, 
even though the right is exercised only by the individua1. 20 
The right to marriage is based on man's natural inclination 
or need for an act which tends primarily to the perfection 
of the species and only secondarily to the perfection of the 
individual. Thus, not all men will enjoy the use of this 
right, because not all men have the obligation correlative 
to it. The right to family life "includes the right to 
20 Ibid., II-II, 49,2; 152,2, ad 1; 5. 
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security and the preservation of a certain economic stability, 
4i 
the right to growth, the right to have children, and the 
right to provide for their physical and spiritual welfare. ,,21 
No one, not even the State, may deny a man the exercise of 
these rights to family life and to marriage unless there is 
a reasonable and grave reason directed to the common good 
that demands such interference. 
The final type of nersonal right concerns the right of 
physical freedom. Since man needs to be physically free in 
order to satisfy his obligations towards himself and his 
family and in order to protect his rights and those of his 
family, he has a natural right to this freedom. This means 
that no man may have a direct dominion over him, nor an in-
direct dominion ,unless he wills it or unless the dominator 
acting for the State, holds him in punishment for crime or 
as a prisoner of war.22 
Besides his personal rights to liberty man also possesses 
social rights, among which are his political, civic, and 
communal rights. 
Man's social rights accrue to him by reason of his es-
sentially social nature. The community is rooted in man's 
gl-Me¥e~l-!t~-Qit., 487. 
22' Since the problem of slavery as defined and explained by 
St. Thomas (II-II, lO,lO,ad 3; 57, 3, ad 2; 189,6 ad 2), is 
not entirely clear, the reader is urged to confer rlinston 11. 
Ashley's thesis, "The Theory of ITatural Slavery according to 
Aristotle and st. Thomas." Ph. D., University of notre Dame, 
Notre Dame, Indiana, 1941. 

for the common welfare the subjects 
of the territory are bound to submit 
to it. They are not free to with-
draw assent or obedience. 25 
However, we admit that the subjects of any government always 
have the power to designate their form of government and to 
agitate for a change in form if it would actually promote 
their welfare; in this case the existing p;overnment must co-
operate for the benefit of the citizens. In a democracy, 
such as the United states, the government must aim ~ r people-
participation in government and a free distr-ibutlon of the 
franchise so that all the competent citizens may have a voice 
in the elections of officials. In regard to the right to 
vote the State must see that it is so regulated '''that public 
order and peace will be preserved, that the natural rights 
of ?oIl will be protected and that all will have equal oppor-
tunity.tl26 In like manner the State must make laws and re-
gulations concerning the fitness of p~blic officials so that 
the welfare of all citizens will be considered. The rights 
to vote and to hold office will be justly limited and defined 
by the State, but always for the common good and for the ul-
timate protection of the most fundamental rights of all. 
1\~an's civic rights concern his relationship to his imme-
diate community; they include the many protections such as 
the rights to making contracts, to trial by jury, to equal 
25 QE. cit., 175-l76. 
26 Ibid., 177. 
benefits of public service. 
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Man's conununal rights concern his recreational, cultural, 
educational, and purely social needs. These particular civic 
and communal rights devend upon the State's obligation to 
practice distributive justice, which will mainly concern it-
self with seeing that substantial equality is always observed. 
'rhus, if wi thin the State certain indivio_uals or groups, be-
cause of poverty or weakness, have special needs, the State 
is bound to fulfill these needs in so far as the common wel-
fare will permit. The main reason for this special consid-
eration of the poor and helpless members of society is that 
"the richer population have many ways of protecting them-
selves, and stand less in need of help from the State; those 
who are badly off have no resources of their own to fall back 
upon, and must chiefly rely upon the assi~tance of the 
State."27 An example of how distributive justice puts a de-
mand on the State in this regard is the univ ersal right in 
the United States for ordinary educational opportunities. 
All citi~ens must receive the same chance for an elementary 
and secondary education; for the State to deprive certairi 
persons of this chance without sufficient reasons is to com-
mit a grave injustice against those persons. And for the 
State to deal unfavorably towards those who need educational 
opportunities more than others is a greater act of injustice. 
27 Pope Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum," 189. 
The State is obliged, however, to set up institutions of 
~ 
higher education only in so far as the capacities of its mem-
bers demand such institutions. 
Although in considering man as a aocial being we have 
noted how he must depend on the State or community for the 
satisfaction of his social needs, we must remember that the 
ultimate perfection of only one man surpasses the natural good 
of the entire State or community. Man is naturally social, 
but he is first of all a person; he has rights that in them-
selves supersede those of the State and must be protected and 
respected by the State. 
Man's final specjfic right, the pursuit of happiness, 
concerns itself with goods and nrivil eges "above tre minimum." 
The peculiar needs, capacities, and abilities of individuals 
will determine their rights to such pursuits as to seek em-
ployment in a variety of businesses, to seEk promotion, to 
seek higher wages or salaries, higher education, to possess 
an equal share of luxury goods as they become more common to 
all members of society; in a word, to progress as the majority 
do, and to receive the common rewards of such progress. 28 
With the development of civilization new rights ensue, so 
that "individuals who contribute to the progress of the common 
good may share in the benefits," with the freedom of opportun-
ity due them. 29 In the United States, where material 
28 LaFarge, Ope cit., 91 (quotations of Francis Gilligan at 
Twenty-First National Conference of Catholic Charities). 
29 Loc. cit. 
development and progress have become connotative of its spirit, 
.. 
special care must be taken by communities, states, and the 
nation at large to see that no individuals or groups are kept 
from enjoying the fruits of this spirit. 
The racial situation in the United states furnishes an 
extensive field for the application of the principles out-
lined according to man's rights to life, to liberty, and to 
the pursuit of happiness. All men can lay claim to these 
three fundamental rights, unless they have deliberately sac-
rificed their claim. The accidental color of one's skin 
(which accident has given birth to the word, "race") or the 
accidental traits and characteristics arising from one's phy-
sical or social development 'have nothing to do with the prin-
ciples or the application of the principles of justice and 
the doctrine of human rights. Human personality is the sub-
stance of man; the color of his skin is a very accidental mark 
of him. All man's rights flow from his substantial being; 
that is why they are called "human rights," and not American 
rights, or white rights, or red-haired-persons' rights. 
We have said that human rights are substantially equal 
in all men. In application, however, we insist that when 
there is a conflict of rights -- not in rights in se, but in 
rights as possessed by this or that individual then empha-
sis must be placed on the rights of the weak, the poor, the 
unportected persons whose rights are more apt to be disregarded 
and even violated. These persons need their rights in order 
4i 
to fulfill the obligations demanded by their human persons. 
Thus, in practice, in the United States the rights of the 
Negro population group will frequently supers ere those of white 
men. If, for example, certain white men find perso~al happi-
ness only when they are separated from Negroes, whom they 
have been taught to dislike, and if this discomfort actually 
conflicts with a Negro's, right to work or to receive an edu-
cation, or to preserve freedom of worship, then the Negro's 
right must be held as superior. Since in this country the 
white men control the organic resources, education, industry, 
commerce, and recreation, it must be the special duty of the 
governmental authorities to'protect the rights of the Negro 
citizens. One of the States most necessary duties is to keep 
unprejudiced the minds of the youth in the country, so that 
they will never stamp as inferior any of their fellow Ameri-
cans, who happen to be Negroes, but who are like themselves 
human persons. 
Here, then, is the crux of the "other half" of the Scho-
lastic answer to the race question in the United States. We 
call this the ethical argument; it carries conviction because 
it is firmly rooted in the metaphysical argument. The solu-
tion to the race problemmust base itself on the admission and 
consequent application of these philosophical principles. It 
is outside the realm of philosophy to put these principles 
into practical action; the philosopher directs, while the so-
., 
ciologists and social workers, the educators and religious 
teachers work. Of course the first step that the workers must! 
take is the propagation of true principles; they must inform 
before they can reform; they must present Truth to intellects 
if they expect Good to come from wills. Any other answer, 
as we shall immediately see, fails in its initial error of 
neglecting or abusing the truths of the basic foundation 
man's essential dignity as a human person -- and of the ul-
timate principle -- the doctrine of human rights •. 
CHAPTER V 
THE tI OTHER ANSWERS fI ANSWERED 
The negative approach as a solution to a problem must 
always remain secondary. If the positive doctrine cannot be 
substantiated, an appeal to "answers to objectors" will never 
fully s~tisfy the reasonable inquirer. Although we have of-
fered positive doctrine as proof of the Scholastic answer to 
the race question, we have a corroborative argument in our 
answers to the various solutions proposed by "the other side." 
Besides its service as the handmaid of positive doctrine this 
negative approach has an important and necessary role to play 
in revealing the errors of philosophers and social thinkers 
who carry great weight in the world today •. The devastating 
effects of Nazism and Communism have been shown to all the 
world, but the dangerous half-truths and vestiges of untruth 
that take subtler forms are not sufficiently known. It is 
our purpose here to disclose not only the philosophical sys-
tems in their bold rejection of those truths upon which the 
welfare of man and society rests, but the false principles 
of less pretentious systems which are perhaps more dangerous 
because they wear masks of "sweet reasonableness" that easily 
deceive the unwary student. 
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To answer the various philosophers interested in the race 
., 
question is a difficult task, because often it is next to im-
possible to get on a common ground of understanding. There-
fore, we have found it necessary to analyze these "other ans-
wers lt in the light of Scholastic principles and to show how 
these answers oppose the values naturally determined by human 
reason and thus destroy the basic foundation and the ultimate 
principle without which we will never arrive at a true under-
standing of Negro-White relationships in the United states. 
The doctrines of the philosophers and social thinkers 
presented in the first chapter of this thesis will not be con-
sidered individually but will be analyzed under the four gen-
eral divisions suggested as reasonable: 1) the postulate of an 
absolute; 2) the meaning of man; 3) the relation of man to 
other men; 4) the value of these doctrines as an answer to the 
race question. 
1) The postulate of an absolute. 
Every system of philosophy must have its to absolutum, 
because the very nature of philosophy is to seek ultimate 
causes, which in turn implies that there will be the ultimate 
cause, the absolute, beyond whicb nothing can be and towards 
which everything must tend. Scholastic philosophy admits one 
Absolute, the true Absolute: God, the Supreme Being of on-
to}ogy, the Provident Creator of theodicy, the only true Ab-
solute of all true philosophy. Since God is what He is, any 
lower being set up as a rival of Him is a blasphemous carica-
.. 
ture, and any human endeavor that neglects Him in a search 
for truth has already pronounced its own death sentence. 
The totalitarian philosophies of Communism, Fascism, and 
Nazism have taken as their absolutes a particular collectivity. 
The definite form of the absolute differed according to the 
historical, political, and social-economic causes aggravating 
the birth of the new absolute. In Russia the absolute became 
the proletarian class; in Italy, the state; in Germany, the 
Aryan race. l 
Contrary to the dictates of human reason the totalitarian 
systems have claimed personality for their class, State, or 
. 
race, which they portray as t1a mysterious being outside and 
above the individuals of whom it is composed, a kind of divi-
nity informing them, by means of collective coercion, with a 
potentiality foreign to their nature."2 To represent a so-
.cial group or "collective whole" alone as real and the indi-
viduals that compose the group as valueless apart from the 
---~---------------1 It is a special study in itself to trace the historical evo 
lution of totalitarianism as it has existed in Russia, Italy, 
and Germany. Complete references to this stu~y are found in 
Religion and the Modern State, Christopher Dawson, Sheed and 
Ward, New Yor~1936; The Metaphysical Relation Between Person 
and Liberty, Rudolf John Harvey, The Catholic University of 
America Press, Washington, 1942; Selfishness and the Social Or 
~, John J. Reardon, The Catholic University of America Press, 
WAshington, 1943. 
2 Luigi Sturzo. The True Life. st. Anthony Guild Press, Pater 
son, New Jersey, 'I'943-;3':" --
group is the,reversal of truth. Dr. O'Toole states: 
I 
Absolutely speaking, the individual 
alone is real, whereas collections 
(classes, groups) are mental con-
structs, which, far from having any 
absolute extramental reality, do 
not even admit of realization out-
side the mind. Actually, a collec-
tion is not a single being, but a 
multitude of distinct individual 
realities whose sole unity is a 
logical or conceptual oneness as-
cribed to them by the mind. Collec-
tions are not real wholes but logi~ 
cal ones. This misplacement of em-
phasis that attaches importance to 
the unreal collection rather than 
to the real individuals mentally 
collected into a group, is an error •••• 3 
It is this unreal collection that becomes the Summum Bonum of 
totalitarianism. Thus, Russia is class-centric; Italy, State-
centric; Germany, race-centric; just as all true philosophy 
is theo-centric. 
Although we cannot prove that the totalitarian absolutes 
totally emerged one from the other, we can note the philoso-
phical de-purification they underwent: from the more universal 
to the more particular group of men, from the material prin-
ciple of economic security and prosperity to political loyalty 
and civic dependence and then to physical well-being and pure-
blood worship. In each stage God is replaced with a more ma-
terial usurper. The last of the line deserves special mention 
because it is the race philosophy par excellence. 
3 George Barry O'Toole. ttThe Pantheism Latent in Totalital?ian 
Absolutism, tt Race: Nation: Person,- 308. 
Racism is the lowest possible form of pseudo-absolutism • 
• Besides being based on the false assumption that a collection 
of individuals equals a being with personality, it errs in 
presupposing tbat men of tlpure-blood rt equals a collection. 
Science has no answer to the question, "What is racial purity 
and Durity of blood?t' In fact, science cannot even def-ine 
race in adequate terms. Yet, if we could admit that there can 
be a pure-blood race, still we would have to prove that mix-
ture of pure-blood with non-pure-blood constitutes in itself 
a blemish or cause of moral or physical weakness. (The oppo-
site of this statement can be shown by the fact that blood 
relationship mas frequently been the cause of physical de-
generation, while blood mixture has seemed to improve the ra-
t 
cial stock.) But tf it were proven that blood mixture is an 
evil, the problem of right and wrong would not be changed, 
since marriage and procreation are faculties attaching to the 
very nature of man and are thereby dependent on man's judg-
ment in accordance with the objectively true order of things. 
It is unfair to class all white-supremists in the United 
States as complete racists, since they do not set up a whole 
race philosophy, making their own race (used in the broad 
sense of the term) the absolute of life. We must state, how-
ever, that tbe theories of white-supremacy are irrational and 
if carried out logically and far enough will lead inevitably 
to a race-philosophy no less subversive than that of the 
National Socialists in Germany. Any attempt to upset the ordo 
• rerum is a threat to the supremacy of God, and the white-
supremists are guilty of perverting this order when they sub-
scribe to any doctrine or practice that admits or implies that 
certain members of the human race are inferior or tainted in 
their natures. 
The irrationalists have no peculiar race philosophy of 
their own, but they are forced to revert to the conclusion: 
matter is the true absolute. For the irrationalists it is not 
the pure-blood of one grou-p but the animality of ,all men that 
determines value. The materialistic scientists begin with 
the animal part of man and end with it. The zoological psy-
chologists begin with the animal part of man and try to spiri-
tualize it by immersing it in the "world soul," which can 
easily develop into a totalitarian philosophy of one sort or 
another. 
The false social philosophers admit the necessity of a 
totalitarian philosophy, but they condemn the restricting 
elements of Communism, Fascism, and Racism; they want a place 
for all men in one all-absorbing unity through common and ab-
solute equality. Stnce men must be equal in something, these 
social philosophers would have men equal in Humanity or Socie-
ty. They have said, "Since God. does not exist, we must invent 
Him." Thus, another pseudo-absolute is born. 
Two special variations of the "old line tl social 
philosophers have arisen recently in the United States. Two 
• 
groups, both very interested in the problem of Negro-White 
relationships, have offered their solutions as the only ones 
satisfying the ideals of mankind and at the same time ful-
filling the particular needs of the problem in the United 
States. 
The first group calls their program liThe City of Man," 
which is closely alligned with the false social philosophers' 
pseudo-absolute, Society. Here God is dethroned to give place 
to the Universal Democracy, which is humanity-centric. Taken 
concretely, in the "City of T',~antl the foundation of law 1s a 
universal participation in government; the foundation of e-
quality is that the state is the agent of collective human 
purposes; the foundation of justice in democracy as a commun-
ity of persons. But ultimately "The City of Han" rests on the 
untrue assumption that God is gl"l.ren being by men and that men 
trace their origin to the unreal col~ ctivity, Humanity. 
The second group is headed by the sociologists, Dr. Gun-
nar Myrdal, who has collected a mass of valuable and interest-
ing facts and has preaented these facts in a scholarly form. 
Dr. Myrdal inslsts in his introduction that as a sociologist 
his purpose is not to philosophize, not to make value judg-
ments, still in his first chapter he proceeds to prove that 
the race question in the United States is a moral problem 
which can be solved only by Americans resolving to submit 
themselves completely to the "American Creed." Thus, he im-
~ 
plies that creed is the objective norm of morality against 
which he measures all his findings; thus, his judgments, tend-
ing to a solution of the American Dilemma, are given value 
only in so far as they are related to the creed. Dr. Myrdal 
claims that he is not interested in whether the creed is 
right or wrong, since he has no personal value judgments of 
such things. But by defining the creed as he does he implies 
that there is nothing more ultimate or more absolute according 
to which the creed has objective valUEr and upon which the 
creed depends for its being what it claims to be. Dr. Myrdal, 
therefore, has presented to the American people the "true ab-
solute" the ttAmerican Cr~ed.tt4 
It is easy to discover the reason for Dr. Myrdal's crea-
tion of a new pseudo-absolute. He dld not begin at the be-
ginning. Instead of going immediately to the true sources of 
the creed, where a true definition will be found in objective 
terms, he discovered sources of his own. Instead of defining 
the creed according to the concise words of the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution of the United states, and 
thus exploring the sources for the concepts expressed there, 
he says that it is the sum of the ideals which "represent to 
the American people the essential meaning of the nation's 
4 It is interesting to note that Dr. Hyrdal always capita-
lizes the words, "American Creed", which indicates a kind of 
personalization of the concept. 
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early struggle for independence.,,5 The tenets of the creed 
., 
are outlined as a kind of emergence from the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment, the theology of sectarian Protestant Chris~ 
tianity, and the terminology of English law, all of Which in 
themselves claim ancestry from a Ifcommon democratic creed as 
it matured in our common Western civilization. ,,6 
Dr. Myrdal misrepresents the American creed; first, ac-
cording to its origin; secondly, according to its essence. 
In writing of the origin of the creed Dr. Myrdal reveals 
his philosophical prejudices. Contrary to its name, the 
period of the Enlightenment by its avowed rejection of the 
supremacy of God and the primacy of the natural law as founded 
on the eternal law ushered in an age of darkness. It was the 
Enlightenment that displaced obedience to divine authority 
with the independence of man as a law unto himself; from this 
complete break with objective authority resulted an indepen-
dent morality which brought with it a boundless license and 
eventual denial of the validity of human reason. If the Ameri 
can creed stems from this period of darkness, then it is 
worthless as a norm of morality, since it will be based on a 
philosophy that forbids any objective ~orm of morality. Pro-
testant Christianity is as unworthy a parent; it was founded 
on a spirit of independence that fostered subjective claims 
5 Myrdal, 2£. cit., 4. 
6 Ibid., 25. 
in preference to divine revelation. English law may be con-
~ 
sidered trustworthy in so f·ar as it followed its traditional 
dependence on the unchangeable natural and divine positive 
law, but it too became errant when it gave way to individual-
istic adaptations and inconsistent exceptions that made law 
the pawn of majority opinion, of brute force, or of mater-
ialistic expediency.' It is fortunate for the lJni ted States 
that Dr. Myrdal errs when he states that the American creed 
has its foundation in these three sources. 
The truth of the matter is that Dr. Myrdal has confused 
the temporal background of ~ truth with the truth itself. 
Even if the framers of the Declaration and Constitution were 
for the most part influenced by Locke's Two Treatises, and 
even by some phases of their Protestant faith and some tenets 
rooted in English law, still the creed is not more or less 
true for all that. For one searching out the truth behind 
the American creed these factors serve only as scenery and 
temporary back-drops of more basic and more universal truths.7 
7 It should be known, for example, that John Locke, to whom 
historians trace Jefferson's statement of sovereignty, was re-
futing the Patriarcha of Sir Robert Filmer, who in turn wrote 
his own work as a condemnation of St. Robert Bellarmine's De 
Laic is. It can also be proven that Jeffers·::m had in in his 
library not only the writings of John Locke, but also those of 
Filmer and Algernon Sidney, who opposed Filmer even before 
Locke did. Had Jefferson taken an interest in original sources 
-- a fact we cannot doubt -- he would have been able to get 
Bellarmine's work at the Princeton Library. Bellarmine was 
the true secondary source of Jefferson's statement of sover-
eignty. Vd., John Clement Rager. ~olitical Philosophy of Bles-
sed Cardinal Bellarmine. Catholic University of America Press, 
The American Declaration and Const1tution are only temporal 
expressions of eternal verities. The American creed fs not 
true and credible because it is American; rather, because it 
is not American but universal and eternal and rooted in the 
true Absolute ( a fact that Dr. Hyrdal nowhere expresses or 
even implies), it is true and credible and naturally accep-
table to mankind. Thus, in essence the creed is not an abso-
lute, nor does it, as expressed in its official documents, 
claim to be so. It is Dr. Myrdal, who wO\lld endow it with 
that spurious essence and thus destroy its efficiency as an 
instrument for solving the problem of race relations. 
2) The meaning of man. 
When totalitarian philosophies dethrone God they must 
logically destroy the individual personalities of men, who 
become necessarily submerged parts of the social community.8 
This depersonalization of man is the consequence of their per-
sonalizing the class, the state, or the race. By giving per-
sonality to a purely intra-mental concept they destroy the 
essences of those real beings who are satd to be fused into 
this conceptual existence. The mode of fusion depends on the 
pseudo-absolute set up. 
Since the guiding principle of Communism is the greater 
productlon and distribution of material goods for the phYSical 
well~being of a classless society, man's spiritual faculties 
8 Reardon, £Ee cit., 140-141. 
are neglected if not completely denied; his dignity becomes 
~ 
the reflected glory of the one class; his immortality, its 
immortal i ty • 
Statism makes man the tool of the State, a society in 
which no individual man can say "we," as he does of his family, 
but only "it."9 
In the racist's society men's endowments are conditioned 
by the physical characteristics produced by "pure-blood. 1I All 
spiritual principles are degraded. Ignoring man's essence 
the racist chooses to exist in man's accidents. 
, . I 
He segregates himself within the 
narrow family of those who bear 
superficial likeness to him, and 
professes to be. the offspring of 
an animal. Proud of his blood and 
other physical characteristics, 
which he shares with the rest of 
the animal kingdom, he spurns the 
incommensurate dignity with which 
the Almighty Creator gratuitously 
vested him. 10 
The racist, if he is consistent, must base the dignity of man 
on a completely materialistic principle; he must lower man to 
a brute level, not only other men but himself included. There 
is no way by which human dignity can be limited to any single 
category of men without at the same time making all men irra-
tional. Concerning the nature of man ( the universal term 
··for t'all men") there can be no compromise; reason demands one 
response and no other. 
9 Fulton J. Sheen. Freedom Under God. Bruce Publishing Co., 
Milwaukee, 1940, 137. 
1 i 
There is no practical difference between the conclusions 
., 
of the totalitarians and the principles of the irrationalists. 
To begin with totalitarian ethics is to end with irrational 
metaphysics; to begin with irrational metaphysics is to end 
with some form of totalitarian ethics. 
The false social philosophers, including the "City of Man' 
group, widen the totalitarian horizon by directing man's exis-
tence to an all-embracing mass entity. For them everything 
must be within, nothing against, nothing outside humanity or 
society. They explicitl'y deny that every human being is an 
individual who is in command of his own life for his own 
supreme purpose and who can use things about him but can be 
used by nothing else in the universe. Here man is made the 
means to a communal end. tlHe exists," as Father Farrell 
states, "not for his own goal, but for the goal of that vague 
community called humanity; he is the necessary ally of some 
vague power; he has no liberty but to hold fast to that non-
personal end that renders his life individually meaningless. nIl 
This philosophy of man as an impersonal cog in a great machine 
is the logical result of a philosophy that has replaced the 
true Absolute with a "blasphemous caricature. 1I 
In Dr. Myrdal's writings the meaning of man is as con-
fused as his description of the American creed. He implies 
11 Walter Farrell, tlBook Review of City of Man," The Thomist, 
III, #4, October 1941, 662-663. 
by neglecting to clarify the prima principia that man's worth 
• proceeds from his adherence to the ideals presented by the 
creed, which is given a kind of absolute essence. By referri 
to the tlEnlightenment" of the "Creed tl Dr. Myrdal implies the 
denial of man's spiritual soul with spiritual faculties which 
give man the power and dignity of a person. 
3) The relation of man to other men. 
'-
The Scholastic doctrine of human. rights is based on the 
proximate foundation man's essential dignity as a human person 
and on the remote foundation of the true Absolute, God. Since 
the various philosophies we have reviewed deny these two foun-
dations it will be impossible for them to accept this further 
development. The truths of Scholastic position are built up 
like a great cathedral: everything has its place, at peace, 
and in harmony. Contrary to these truths the creators of 
pseudo-absolutes attempt to use sand for stones; always there 
is chaos and confusion. 
In the totalitarian systems men receive their rights from. 
the group to which they belong; they have no obligations to-
wards a higher power; their obligations towards other men of 
their group are on the basis of their mutual relationship to 
the group and not to one another. Stealing from a neighbor, 
for example, is wrong because a neighbor is a member of the 
class or state or race, and it is the group that suffers the 
loss. In a society of this kind there is absolute equality 
between the members. But it is the equality of slaves who are 
.. 
bound to the same master. Then, too, equality extends only 
to one group of men, not to all men. Caucasians, for example, 
may be judged by them to be totally superior to all other rac-
es. Thus the Aryan racists taught that "the races of mankind 
differ so greatly from one another, by virtue of their innate 
and inalterable character, that the lowest of them is farther 
removed from the highest than it is from the highest species 
of brutes. tl12 The totalitarian, and more especially the ra-
cist, commits a singularly embarrassing blunder. By confusing 
the generic concept of ~lman dignity with the entity of his 
own particular race he degrades to the level of animal life, 
not only other men but also himself with his "pure fl confreres; 
he annuls in his own mind the very dignity which he wishes to 
monoDOlize. 13 They would leave all men with no dignity and 
consequently with no rights. 
For the false social philosophers equality is not the 
result of men's personality-likenesses, but the unity of one 
man to another in humanity. Justice, therefore, does not pro-
ceed from the virtue of man who performs his obligations ·dic-
tated by the necessities of his human nature, but comes from 
a democracy as a community of people who, happenoto be living 
together. The fundamental difference between this belief and 
12 Race: Nation: Person, vii. 
13 Achille, loco cit., 109. 
true doctrine is that human rights must flow from the very 
.. 
nature of man as a human person; they must be intrinsic to 
him. These other phllosouhles would draw man's freedom from 
its source in the universal ana total democracy; thus they 
make the principle of man's freedom something outside and ex-
trinsic to him; freedom exists, therefo"'."'e, not for man as his 
own natural characteristic, but to the eno that man may work 
to t,he end beyond himself which is wi thin· humanity. In this 
system humanity or society will determine rights and duties, 
which are necessarily temporary, mutable, violable grants of 
an extrinsic order. Based on such fragile Drinciples man-
will soon become the vassal of an- irrational despot. 
If D'r'. Myrdal wishes his readers to believe that Ameri-
cans have rights and obligations towards one another solel~ 
because their American creed has granted theII' , then Americans 
have not the inalienable rights they claim. For a right to 
be inalienable it must come from an antecedent obligation that 
is determined by the need of the person who will claim the 
right; t.hen too the right must ult.imately proceed from the 
Absolute Being, who has ordered the needs of man to a purpose-
ful end. Rights and obligations must be intrinsically a part 
of man; otherwise they are superimposed and contrary to his 
rational nature. Dr. Myrdal destroys the force and essence 
of human rights by refusing to found them as intrinsic parts 
of human nature, which is in turn maoe in the image of God. 
· 10'"' 
Only firmly established concepts can assure harmonious rela-
.. 
tionships between men. Ethical principles must be set down 
explicitly and definitely. To call the race question a "moral 
question" and then to clefine morality as the conflict between 
"moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and gen-
erality," that is, "the valuations nreserved on the general 
plane which we shall call the ~American Creed- .•• and, on ·the 
otber hand, the valuations of specific planes of individual 
and group.living,,,l4 is to confuse the issue rather than solve 
it. There must be a recall of basic postulates and a defini-
tion of objective terms; there must be a return to reason. 
walter Lippmann says that philosophers must look to the tra-
ditional viewpoint of weste~n civilization; he writes: 
The institutions of the western 
world were formed by men who 
learned to regard themselves as 
invtolable nersons because they 
were rational and free. They 
meant by rational that they were 
capable of comprehending the mor& 
order of the universe and their 
place in this moral order. They 
meant wben they regarded them-
selves as free, that within that 
order they had a personal moral 
responsibility to perform their 
duties and to exercise their cor-
responding rights. From this con-
ception of the unity of mankind in 
a rational order the western world 
has derived its conception of law, 
and that the cbaract.er of all par-
ticular laws is to be judged by 
whether they conform to or violate, 
----------------------
14 Myrdal, QE. cit •. , xliii. 
approach to or depart from the ra-
tional order of the universe and ~-
of man's nature. 15 
4) The value of these doctrines as an answer to the race 
question •. 
For the totalitarian philosophies there is no "race prob-
1em"; in their own society, which is autonomous, men are iden-
tified and swallowed up by the class or state or race. In the 
Communistic community race means nothing; because of this fact 
the Communist propagandists deceive many members of the op-
pressed races by describing the equality afforded all who 
throw in their lots with the "classless society." In the Fa-
cistic society race is usually identified with the members of 
the State; consequently racial characteristics are soon lost 
sight of, as long as all remain loyal to the absolute State. 
In actual-fact, however, Fascistic states utilize national 
patriotism by 'marking hostile racial groups as disloyal to the 
State and therefore unworthy to be members; from here it is 
an easy step to the fully developed race philosophy of "pure-
blood. " 
In the specific "race society" everything is measured by 
physical participation in the deified "pure-blood" group, 
whether it be called Aryan or Caucasian or any other racial 
type. The race problem is the only problem in such a society. 
Family life, education, recreation, national culture are 
i5--wait~;;-Lipp~aT'tT't: "Man in American Education," Democra~, 
Should It Survive?, 51. 
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subordinated to safeguarding racial purity in individuals for 
the "pure-blood" society. The racist's solution is no' for 
man but for certain men who have common animal characteristics. 
Because the racist's philosophy insults the nature of man, his 
dignity, and his rights, it must be driven from the earth as 
the worst kind of moral plague. 
Since the materialists deny the spiritual faculties of 
man, they are forced to judge man as different types of animal 
specimens. For them race is a convenient means of classifi-
cation. A~though they would claim equality for men in their 
common animality, practically they choose higher types of 
soul-less men for their preferable bodily traits. Haterialism 
has always been the forerunner of an irrational degeneration 
of men that easily gives birth to a kind' of totalitarian ra-
cism. The materialists can never solve the race question by 
their monistic conception of life. The reality of spirit de-
mands admission first. 
The "City of Man" philosophers believe that they have 
found the solution for a true understanding between all groups 
of men. But, as we have proven, their solution is based on 
untrue Iffirst principles. 11 Their efforts may be admirabl e, 
but their purpose is predetermined to tragedy. By rejecting 
the established order of things they are led into chaos. They 
have yet to learn that truth is objective, that it is one and 
final. 
lOB 
Dr. Myrdal was correct when he said that ~he problem of 
~ 
Negro-White relationships in the United States was a moral 
issue. But he was wrong when he defined what he meant by 
"moral issue." Until social thinkers, such as Dr •. Myrdal, de-
cide to set down certain primary truths as credible they will 
never arrive at solutions of any social problem, least of all 
one so complicated and so intimately connected with the pri-
vate prejudices and social habits of Americans as the so-
called "race problem. II Social thinkers must learn to be ra-
dical,- in the orginal meaning of "radical" as "deeply rooted." 
The Scholastic answer is radical, because it has its roots in 
fundamental, immutable truths. It alone of all the answerS 
here given satisfies the demands of human reason, because it 
alone defines the inalienable rights which all men possess as 
human persons. 
The full Scholastic answer has been given by a simple 
presentation of its positive doctrine. .A secondary, negative 
proof has been given by the presentation and refutation of 
all "other answers,~' which enter the realm of philosophy. It 
is not the purpose of philosophy to follow up its program of 
reason with practical techniques as applied to the daily lives 
of men in society. The adaptation of ,the "foundation" and 
the "principle" to the acting lives of Americans begin~' here 
where the "true understanding ll ends. 
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